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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study adopts a discursive psychological approach to an analysis of 
interviews with nine clinical psychologists on the subject of their work with 
children in NHS-based Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services.  The 
objective of the study was to explore how child clinical psychologists talk about 
their work, with a particular focus on the discursive and interactional aspects of 
the discourse, and participants’ orienting to, and providing justifications for, the 
morally dubious status of the various practices that they described in their talk.  
The analysis delineates complex rhetorical strategies of accountability 
management in talk about practices depicted as potentially problematic.  These 
included: (1) the ‘severe end’ rhetorical device that functioned to warrant the use 
of medication; (2) the minimisation strategy that was used to manage diagnostic 
problems by constructing diagnoses in a minimal or safer manner; (3) 
normalisation techniques which served to downplay and re-define contested 
practices as less problematic or indeed as positive; (4) doing ‘being democratic’ 
that constructed troubling practice as democratic; (5) employing ‘maxims of 
practical politics’ that seemed to legitimise contested practices by invoking liberal 
and pragmatic arguments; and (6) the discursive move of redirecting 
accountability to service users or the institution.  The discursive analysis of the 
extended accounts also demonstrated how participants oriented to notions of the 
moral nature of their practice and their morally adequate personal and 
professional identities.  The results of this study indicate that clinical 
psychologists face a moral quandary, suggesting that perhaps clinical psychology 
practice, particularly with children whose distress or behaviour is conceptualised 
as mental illness, entails a constant grappling with moral issues.  Implications for 
clinical practice are discussed in light of the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
1. Chapter one - Introduction 
1.1. Style and terminology 
1.2. Literature review 
1.3. Brief history of child clinical psychology and childhood mental      
       disorder: a critical perspective  
1.3.1. The ascendency of psy-professions 
1.3.2. The stabilisation of child psychology 
1.3.3. Child-rearing and psychologisation 
1.3.4. The neo-liberal culture 
1.4. Current practice and provision of child clinical psychology 
1.4.1. The impact of diagnosis 
1.4.2. The impact of medication 
1.4.3. Power and consent 
1.4.4. Other issues related to clinical practice with children  
1.4.5. Organisational issues and individual psychologists 
1.5. Previous investigations of professional accounts 
1.5.1. Studies of other professionals’ accounts of their practice 
1.5.2. Studies of clinical psychologists’ accounts of their practice 
1.6. Summary and justification for the current study 
1.7. Research questions 
2. Chapter two - Methodology 
2.1. Methodological rationale 
2.2. Epistemological position 
2.3. Discourse analysis  
2.4. Discursive psychology  
2.5. Ethics 
2.6. Sample size and generalisability 
2.7. Participant selection criteria and recruitment 
2.8. Profile of participants 
2.9. Interviews 
 9 
10 
10 
11 
 
12 
13 
14 
16 
18 
19 
19 
21 
21 
22 
23 
23 
26 
27 
28 
29 
29 
29 
31 
33 
35 
35 
36 
37 
38 
6 
 
2.10. Transcription 
2.11. Analytical procedure  
2.11.1. Reading  
2.11.2. Coding and initial analysis 
2.11.3. Selection of extracts 
2.11.4. Analysis 
2.12. Positioning of the researcher  
3. Chapter three - Analysis 
3.1. Contextualising the talk-in-interaction 
3.1.1. Orienting to the research requirements 
3.1.2. Orienting to personal and professional moral identity 
3.1.2.1. Orienting to professional moral identity 
3.1.2.2. Orienting to personal moral identity 
3.2. Strategies of accountability management 
3.2.1. The ‘severe end’ rhetorical device 
3.2.2. Minimisation  
3.2.3. Normalising techniques  
3.2.3.1. Routinisation 
3.2.3.2. Renegotiating, re-categorising or re-defining  
3.2.4. Doing being democratic 
3.2.5. Maxims of practical politics 
3.2.5.1. Nobody should be compelled 
3.2.5.2. You have to be practical 
3.2.6. Redirecting the accountability  
3.2.6.1. Invoking of institutional demands 
4. Chapter four - Discussion 
4.1. Summary and discussion of findings 
4.2. Situating findings within the wider discourses 
4.2.1. The effects of macro on micro 
4.2.2. The effects of micro on macro 
4.3. Comparison with other studies 
40 
40 
41 
41 
42 
43 
43 
44 
44 
46 
47 
48 
48 
51 
51 
55 
58 
59 
61 
65 
68 
68 
70 
71 
74 
76 
76 
79 
80 
81 
82 
7 
 
4.4. Research and clinical implications 
4.4.1. Possibilities for future research 
4.4.2. Implications for clinical practice and possibilities for future  
          action 
4.4.2.1. Developing reflective and reflexive practice  
4.4.2.2. The role of the psychologists and clinical practice 
4.4.2.3. Policy and service delivery 
4.4.2.4. Dissemination of findings 
4.5. Critical review 
4.5.1. Under-analysis through summary 
4.5.2. Under-analysis through taking sides 
4.5.3. Under-analysis through over-quotation or through isolated  
          quotation 
4.5.4. The circular identification of discourses and mental constructs 
4.5.5. False survey 
4.5.6. Under-analysis through spotting 
4.6. Reflexive review 
4.6.1. Reflection of the methodological approach  
4.6.2. Reflection on research write-up 
4.6.3. Further reflections on my position 
4.6.4. Final reflections 
References 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: UEL ethics approval 
Appendix 2: Invitation letter 
Appendix 3: Participant information sheet  
Appendix 4: Recruitment advert 
Appendix 5: Profile of participants  
Appendix 6: Interview schedule 
Appendix 7: Consent form 
Appendix 8: Demographic profile form  
Appendix 9: Transcription convention 
84 
84 
85 
 
85 
86 
88 
88 
89 
89 
89 
89 
 
90 
90 
90 
91 
91 
91 
92 
93 
94 
112 
112 
113 
114 
117 
118 
119 
121 
122 
123 
8 
 
Appendix 10: Illustration of coded transcripts  
Appendix 11: Worked example of discursive analysis 
Appendix 12: Talk preceding extract 5 
Appendix 13: Maxims of practical politics 
Appendix 14: Examples of my use of ‘we’ as footing 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
This study adopts a Discursive Psychological (DP) approach to the subject of 
clinical psychologists’ work with children. Following a DP tradition, the research 
did not start with a set of predetermined hypotheses. Rather, the objective of the 
study was to explore how child clinical psychologists talk about their work to see 
what would transpire during the research interview interaction between myself, a 
trainee clinical psychologist and the researcher, and the nine participants, clinical 
psychologists working in NHS-based Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
Services (CAMHS). As the analysis progressed, the analytic foci became 
increasingly refined. Thus, this thesis focuses on the complex rhetorical 
strategies deployed by clinical psychologists in their management of moral 
accountability in justifying their practice with children. I will argue that clinical 
psychologists are caught in a moral quagmire, suggesting that maybe clinical 
psychological practice, particularly with children whose distress or behaviour is 
conceptualised as mental illness, entails a constant grappling with moral issues.  
In company with Rapley (2004) and Wetherell (1998) I take the view that 
incorporating Foucauldian ideas “offers a deepening of DP analysis rather than a 
necessary competing account” (Rapley, 2004, p. 12, emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, I will draw on Foucauldian scholarship in my introduction and the 
final discussion chapter in order to situate the micro-level analysis of talk-in-
interaction (which itself will be explicated in my methodology and presented in the 
analysis chapter) within a wider context. This attempt, somewhat artificially, to 
separate what are sometimes considered to be the micro and macro perspectives 
on discourse was mainly to preserve academic and epistemological clarity. 
The thesis is presented in four chapters. The first chapter critically delineates the 
history of child clinical psychology and what came to be called childhood mental 
disorders. The latter part of the chapter examines some of the problems with 
clinical practice with children and reviews the existing studies of professional 
accounts. The subsequent chapters present methodology, analysis, discussion, 
and a critical review of this research. First, however, it might be important to 
make a number of points regarding the adopted style and terminology used. 
10 
 
1.1.  STYLE AND TERMINOLOGY 
I have written this thesis in the first person to acknowledge that it is a 
construction, rather than a disinterested and objective account, which could 
otherwise be implied by using the third person.  
Throughout this thesis, I will frequently use the terms ‘children’, ‘child’ or 
‘adolescent’. I recognise that whilst these terms are rooted in a biological reality 
of immaturity, they are nevertheless social constructions that emerged within a 
particular socio-cultural, linguistic, political, economic, legal and historical context 
(e.g., James & Prout, 1997). For example, the notion of ‘child’ or ‘childhood’ is a 
relatively recent construction, since “in medieval society the idea of childhood did 
not exist” (Ariès, 1960, p. 125). Additionally, I often use the term ‘children’ 
because, in my opinion, the frequent repetition of ‘children, young people and 
their families’ could be distracting for the reader.  
To further ease readability, I have also refrained from repeated inserting 
quotation marks around terms that have been recognised as problematic (e.g., 
Boyle, 1999; Horwitz, 2002; Rapley, Moncrieff & Dillon, 2011; Sarbin, 1968; 
Szasz, 1974), such as the terms currently prevalent within the mental health 
discourse, including ‘mental disorder’, ‘mental illness’ and related psychiatric 
diagnostic labels. Finally, given that in present British law ‘mental illness’ is 
considered to be a sub-category of ‘mental disorder’ (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2005) 
whereas in the introduction to the latest Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5) ‘mental disorder’ is subsumed under ‘mental illness’, I 
have used these terms interchangeably in this study. 
 
1.2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
To review literature for this study, I searched EBSCO, an international online 
database resource (all databases selected and all years available). In order to 
keep up to date with new material published, I searched at three discrete points 
in time: November 2011, August 2012 and March 2013. Variations of the 
following search terms were used: 
• (professional) or (mental) or (psychologist) or (clinical) or (psychology) AND 
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• (accounts) or (talk) or (construction) AND 
• (practice) or (work) AND 
• (children) or (child) AND 
• (discourse) or (discursive) or (analysis) 
After refining the focus of the study, subsequent searches included the following 
terms: 
• (moral) or (ethical) or (dilemma) or (issue) AND 
• (justification) or (justify) or (accounting) or (accountability) or (stake) 
The abstracts were reviewed and the full texts of those articles that seemed 
particularly relevant were obtained. I also conducted a hand search from the 
references of the most relevant papers. In addition, I searched Google using 
similar terms, which I found useful for directing me to relevant books, websites, 
and journal articles. Other literature included in this study was drawn to my 
attention through my university teaching or recommended by academics from 
other universities. 
 
1.3.  BRIEF HISTORY OF CHILD CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILDHOOD 
MENTAL DISORDER: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE  
Situating child clinical psychology in the historical framework is, in my opinion, 
crucial in understanding the current state of the profession and its praxis. Clinical 
psychology is a relatively young profession, having been established only about a 
hundred and twenty years ago. Hall (2007) noted that prior to the mid-twentieth 
century, British applied psychology had far more people working in child than 
adult welfare, and the first applied professionals were educational psychologists. 
The very emergence of child clinical psychology is closely linked to the rise of 
other disciplines prefixed with psy-, including psychiatry, psychoanalysis, 
educational and developmental psychology, which are referred to as the ‘psy-
complex’ (Ingleby, 1985) by critical scholars.  
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1.3.1.  The ascendency of psy-professions 
According to Foucault (1961; 2006) the discourse of mental illness emerged 
during the Enlightenment through the process of social exclusion and control. In 
the context of the Western world, in which reasoning became highly valued, 
behaviour that was seen as ‘unreasonable’ began to be segregated into 
institutional confinement of the 19th century lunatic asylums. Szasz (1978, p. 
xviii) argued how, “with the decline of religion and the growth of science in the 
eighteenth century, the cure of (sinful) souls, which had been an integral part of 
the Christian religions, was recast as the cure of (sick) minds, and became an 
integral part of medicine", allowing the psychiatrists of the day to assume an 
‘expertise’ in dealing with people now seen as mentally ill. Scull (1979) 
highlighted the economic and political justifications for this segregation of people 
who were ‘unemployed and unemployable’. He argued that the monopolisation of 
psychiatry and its ‘treatment’ methods became the central mission of the newly 
established capitalist society and interests of the State. 
Hence, by the end of the 19th century, children along with the mentally ill, the 
disabled, criminals, and the poor, became a target of ‘individualisation 
programmes’ by psychiatrists (Rose, 1989). Gingell (2001) has noted that 
children in the asylums were admitted for similar reasons to children’s admissions 
to psychiatric wards today: they were unmanageable in the community due to 
perceived behavioural difficulties and dangerousness. The death rate of children 
was high and contact with the family post admission was minimal (Gingell, 2001).  
In the context of the historical development of positivism in the late nineteenth 
century, contemporary psychology emerged and sought to gain ‘scientific’ (for 
which read reductionist - empiricist) credibility by aligning itself with the already 
well-entrenched psychiatry. It too attempted to emulate the methods of the 
natural sciences in theorising and predicting human conduct (James & James, 
2008) and codifying suffering into disease-like categories (Rapley et al., 2011, p. 
1). From its very emergence, the notion of mental illness therefore seems to be 
inextricably a moral endeavour framed as science, where psychologists and 
psychiatrists became the new arbiters of the moral code (Sarbin & Mancuso, 
1970). 
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1.3.2.  The stabilisation of child psychology 
‘Child’ psychology did not fully emerge until the foundation of Child Guidance 
Clinics in the early 1920s – up until then child psychology was limited to Eugenic 
inspired assessments of hard to educate children by psychologists, such as Cyril 
Burt and Lewis Terman. The early developments of child psychology in the 
nineteenth century also went hand in hand with the development of universal and 
compulsory education (Rose, 1989). Foucault (1977) argued that the introduction 
of mass schooling not only set criteria of what constitutes ‘normal’ childhood 
behaviour, but also authorised observing and disciplining children. According to 
Foucault (1977), schools resembled ‘telescopes’ or ‘microscopes’ through which 
the population could be scrutinised. Hendrick (1997, p. 47; see also Timimi, 
2002) asserts that mass schooling turned children into attractive ‘scientific’ 
subjects for a variety of professionals, giving rise to the Child Study movement 
(1880s-1914). This encouraged the opening of the first child psychology clinic by 
Witmer in 1896 in the U.S. and Binet’s development of the first intelligence scale 
for children in 1905.  
Furthermore, the growing number of various child welfare bureaucracies and 
legislations with the emphasis on promoting children’s health and wellbeing 
paved the way for ‘psycho-medically’ framed concepts of childhood (Hendrick, 
1997, p. 50). Critics asserted that the growing public regulation of children 
through both mandatory education and health care occurred not because of 
concerns about children’s welfare and rights necessarily, but because, as future 
workers, they required moralisation in order to ensure social efficiency and the 
production of “docile and capable bodies” (Foucault, 1977, p. 294; Rose 1989). 
Some authors (e.g., Graham, 2008; Timimi, 2002) have argued that the 
introduction of mass schooling may have been largely responsible for the 
contemporary concerns with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), 
whilst others (e.g., Baldwin & Anderson, 2000; Newnes, 2011; Timimi & Taylor, 
2004) have argued that the current trend of diagnosing children with ADHD and 
prescribing drugs is a modern method of social control. However, Miller and Rose 
(1988) have cautioned against simplifying notions of ‘social control’ and 
‘medicalisation’. Whilst these are significant, these authors have highlighted the 
complexity of changing social, political, institutional and moral conditions, 
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prevailing cultural values and social expectations that have led to transformations 
of the meaning of childhood and normality and given rise to the regulatory 
expertise of subjective life in general.  
In the 1920s and 1930s, the development of the influential, psychiatrically 
dominated and psychoanalytically oriented Child Guidance Clinics had an 
important impact on the ways society came to understand childhood and child-
rearing (Hendrick, 1997). The significance of the these clinics was not only in 
promoting the psychological construction of childhood but also in identifying 
‘abnormal’, ‘nervous’, ‘maladjusted’ and delinquent children and ‘treating’ them 
within newly established multidisciplinary teams of psy-professionals (Rose, 
1985). Thus, under the influence of these clinics childhood was given its own 
repertoire of disorders. However, the promotion of mental hygiene and the 
welfare movement could only be successful in so far as it managed to actively 
engage parents in these new ways of thinking about childhood and ‘normality’ so 
that they would commit themselves voluntarily to discipline, moralise and rear 
their children according to the ideal norm (Rose, 1989). 
The post-war time saw the expansion of the major Welfare Acts in the UK, such 
as the National Health Service Act (1946) and the Children Act (1948), in an 
effort to intervene early and prevent future social problems. Numerous 
community mental health services and child psychiatric clinics were established, 
with a correspondingly growing number of psy-professionals being trained to deal 
with the ‘problem families’ and ‘difficult children’ of the deprived working class 
(Rose, 1989). Psy-professions could now claim to have developed a firm 
scientific basis and evidence-based expertise (Graham, 1976) and produce more 
childhood psychometric tests and child developmental theories, thus cementing 
the establishment of the social project of ‘normalising’ misfit children and 
moralising socially unsanctioned behaviours as we know it today.  
1.3.3.  Child-rearing and psychologisation 
Child-rearing as the domain of experts who were said to acquire specialist 
knowledge is, similar to the medicalisation of childhood, not a new phenomenon. 
In Western society between the 17th and the mid 19th centuries, local priests 
were the principal advice-givers to parents to ensure the moral development of 
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their offspring (Geboy, 1981). However, with the increased successfulness of 
free-market economies that led to the increase in working hours and the 
breakdown of traditional sources of support, such as close-knit extended families 
and communities (Timimi, 2006), concerned parents started to rely on the child-
rearing manuals and technologies of psy-professionals.  
Rose (1989, p. xi) wrote that since the 2nd World War, psychology has 
increasingly provided the language in which the troubles of childhood could be 
framed, and promised the expertise for alleviating them alongside psychiatry. 
These languages and norms have been disseminated via popular media, 
cultivating the culture of dissatisfied parents, teachers and communities who 
would willingly seek professional help in order to achieve the desired norm (Rose, 
1989). Parents can nowadays read any number of parenting books, newspaper 
columns or internet websites devoted to issues of parenting, obtain leaflets 
created by the various government and voluntary organisations, or watch TV 
documentaries such as ‘Supernanny’, in which a self-proclaimed ‘expert’ comes 
to a family’s home to assist parents with their children's behaviour. 
Parents are expected to be able to recognise (ab)normality, but the subsequent 
intervention is the business of the professional. This phenomenon came to be 
known as ‘psychologisation’, a notion that not only professionals, but also 
ordinary citizens, came to view their problems as amenable to psychological 
treatment. Nowadays more than ever, it seems to be taken-for-granted that you 
need an ‘expert’ to provide you with ‘specialist advice’ on how best to manage 
both your healthy as well as troubled and troubling child (Timimi, 2006).  
Thus as the psy-complex proliferated, inevitable claims were made about the 
pervasiveness of childhood psychiatric disorders. Currently, the Department of 
Health states that: “One in ten children aged 5-16 years has a clinically 
diagnosable mental health problem. At any one time, more than a million children 
will have a diagnosable mental health disorder.” (DOH, 2011, emphasis added). 
Similarly, the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ (RCPSYCH) website asserts that: 
“Mental disorders in children and young people are increasing and represent a 
hidden epidemic.” (RCPSYCH, 2011, emphasis added). And this all despite the 
fact that there are no medical tests to determine diagnosis and no specific 
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biological markers for any mental illness, despite years of extensive and 
expensive research (e.g., Rapley et al., 2011; Timimi, 2006). Moreover, it has 
been repeatedly demonstrated that diagnostic categories lack validity and 
reliability, given that no clear distinction can be made between ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ and the fact that there is a significant overlap between different 
diagnostic categories (Kendell & Jablensky, 2003; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997). Based 
on the above, the critics have argued that diagnosis is an exercise of subjective, 
moral judgment on socially unsanctioned behaviour rather than a product of 
scientific advancement (e.g., Boyle, 1990, 1999, 2007; Sarbin & Mancuso, 1970, 
1980; Szasz, 1974).  
1.3.4.  The neo-liberal culture 
Timimi (2010) asserts that the increase in the emotional difficulties in the UK’s 
child population (UNICEF, 2007) is largely related to the growth of neo-liberal free 
market capitalism, and its endorsement of freedom, choice and individual rights 
at the expense of collective responsibility: 
When this system shows itself to undermine children’s happiness … 
instead of asking ourselves painful questions about our potential role in 
producing this unhappiness, we view our children’s difficulties as 
resulting from biological diseases that require medical treatment … 
thus biological psychiatry gives governments new ways of regulating 
the population, particularly in democratic societies where states must 
seek to rule by consent (p. 696).  
Hence, as numerous other authors (e.g., Boyle, 2011; Dillon, 2013; Smail, 2001) 
also argue, the biomedical model of mental distress serves to absolve powerful 
authorities and authority figures of responsibility for children’s predicament and 
“provides a temporary relief to the beleaguered, intensely monitored child carers 
and spares all from further scrutiny” (Timimi, 2010, p. 697). As Rapley et al. 
(2011) note:  
To describe what are actually, and essentially, morally troubling issues 
- in this case children behaving in ways which make manifest their 
adult-created misery … or straightforwardly matters of material 
circumstances … as medical conditions is not only to make a moral – 
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not a ‘scientific’ – choice in and of itself (cf. Bentall, 1992), but also to 
strain the medical metaphor past breaking (p. 4, emphasis in original). 
Timimi (2010) goes on to suggest that the medicalisation of childhood enterprise 
fits well into the current Western consumerist fast food culture, and asserts that 
we have achieved the ‘McDonaldisation’ of children’s mental health. He claims 
that application of medical technologies, especially psychopharmaceutical, to 
manage children’s behaviour and emotional states resembles fast food in many 
ways. For example, it too does not require much consumer engagement with the 
product, and provides an easy solution with a potential to cause long-term 
damage to both individual and public health generally, creating life-long 
consumers. It can be argued that the recent medication-centred practice is partly 
a result of the Western populations’ desire for instant satisfaction and a quick 
technical fix for complex problems, which fits into a busy lifestyle (Bracken & 
Thomas, 2005; Harper, 2013b).  
Furthermore, in the context of neo-liberal free market economies children and 
their ‘needs’ have come to be viewed as legitimate targets for the consumer 
market (Timimi, 2002). Indeed, we have arrived at what Breggin (2001) named 
the psychopharmaceutical complex, which comprises of the multi-billion-dollar 
pharmaceutical industry and the American Psychiatric Association (APA), 
creators of the several-times-revised DSM1. It has been suggested that one of the 
reasons for the ever-increasing creation of new diagnostic categories, such as 
the newly proposed DSM-V criteria for Reactive Attachment Disorder of Infancy 
or Early Childhood, and related rise in drug prescriptions to both children and 
adults is a result of marketing strategies of pharmaceutical companies, rather 
than ‘robust scientific’ research (Baldwin & Anderson, 2000; Cohen, 2004; Healy, 
1999, 2004; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Moncrieff, 2011). 
These authors have cast light on the professional, political and commercial 
interests, and serious ethical controversies around the increasing medicalisation 
of “problems of living” (Szasz, 1960, p. 115) in order to make profit. With the 
above historical critical perspective in mind, I now move on to delineate the 
current contexts of child psychology practice.   
                                            
1 For a history of critiques of the DSM, see Newnes (2013b). 
2 This reflects longstanding philosophical disputes between realism and relativism. In their ‘Death 
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1.4.  CURRENT PRACTICE AND PROVISION OF CHILD CLINICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 
Harper (2010, p. 13; see also Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992) argues that “clinical 
psychology continues to be defined by its humble origins”. Hence, it appears that 
UK clinical psychology in general has struggled to escape medical hegemony, 
and indeed has continuously assisted psychiatry in legitimising the biomedical 
discourse through various practices (e.g., Boyle, 2011; Newnes, 2013a). These 
might include, for instance, promoting the discourse of a scientist-practitioner and 
evidence-based practice, undertaking psychometric assessments, or 
emphasising the bio-psychosocial model. Whilst the latter acknowledges the 
social factors in the aetiology of distress, it subsequently undermines them by 
implying that biology always has primacy (Boyle, 2006) and thus practically 
becomes a ‘bio-bio-bio’ model (Read, 2005). 
Currently, all statutory services that contribute to the mental health care of 
children and young people between 0-18 years can be embraced by the term 
‘Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services’ (CAMHS). They are organised in a 
four-tier system, which covers all types of provision and intervention from Tier 1 - 
with a focus on mental health promotion, prevention and primary level of care, 
Tier 2 - provided by specialist individual professionals, Tier 3 - specialist and 
multi-disciplinary community-based services for more severe, complex or 
persistent mental health difficulties, through to Tier 4 - highly specialised care 
services, such as in-patient units. In its recent report, the British Psychological 
Society (BPS, 2008a) expressed concern that: 
CAMHS often employ a very medical model - locating a problem or 
illness within the child or young person. Frequently, the diagnosed 
problem is addressed by the use of medication or a course of, for 
example, cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT) which is prescribed like a 
medication, rather than as a collaborative therapeutic approach to 
working with the child and their family (p. 3).  
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Below I will consider the current child clinical psychology practice in CAMHS in 
relation to some of the above-mentioned issues in greater detail, commencing 
with the impact of diagnosis and medication. 
1.4.1.  The impact of diagnosis 
It has been argued that diagnosis can bring necessary services to the child, 
including financial benefits in the form of Disability Living Allowance or extra 
classroom support. However, as Newnes (2011, p. 222) points out: “In such a 
well balanced - and apparently mutually beneficial - system it can be difficult to 
remember that the child is being given toxic and experimental drugs that ‘work’ by 
effectively overdosing his [sic] metabolism.”  
Furthermore, the impact of psychiatric terminology from a psy-professional can 
have devastating consequences, not only for the children’s lives, but also for the 
wider social context. For example, psychiatric diagnoses can materially affect 
people’s living circumstances by limiting their access to resources or through 
employment discrimination due to stigma attached to a mental health diagnosis. 
In addition, psychiatric terminology is “seriously corrosive of the sense that we 
can have, and make, of ourselves and our circumstances” (Rapley et al., 2011, p. 
7). Chloe, a young person who was given a label of an eating disorder, offered an 
account of how it felt to be diagnosed: ”I feel bad enough about myself anyway, 
why do I need to feel bad about being anorexic now?“ (Leeming, Boyle & 
Macdonald, 2009, p. 16). Rapley et al. (2011, p. 2-5) further argue that wrapping 
understandable and often highly adaptive reactions to extremely challenging 
experiences of living, such as child abuse, into a de-contextualised language of 
internal individual pathology, renders complex moral, social and political issues 
invisible (see also Newnes & Radcliffe, 2005). 
1.4.2.  The impact of medication 
Prescriptions for psychiatric drugs to children and adolescents have skyrocketed 
in the UK despite the lack of evidence for the long-term safety and effectiveness 
and the fatal flaws of some drug studies (Sparks & Duncan, 2004). For example, 
the Department of Health (DOH, 2011) and the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2006) provide figures showing that, in the UK between 
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1994 and 2010, prescriptions for stimulant drugs (e.g., Ritalin®) to children under 
16 rose from 6,000 in 1994 to an astonishing 660,000 in 2010, representing a 
10,000% rise (see also Timimi, & Radcliffe, 2005). It has been noted that this 
figure is in fact an underestimate of true rates, since the DOH data do not include 
hospital and private clinic prescriptions (Baldwin, 2000). Leading figures in 
psychiatry and the critics of the use of medication in children, maintain that drugs 
have a similar effect on all individuals, irrespective of whether or not they are 
displaying ‘symptoms’ of a mental illness, therefore seriously undermining a 
widespread theory that medication ‘repairs’ a biochemical imbalance in child’s 
brain (e.g., Breggin, 2001; Moncrieff, 2008).  
Moreover, there have been serious concerns raised with regards to the toxicity of 
drugs on children’s metabolism and their developing brains (Baldwin, 2000; 
Breggin, 2001; Breggin & Cohen, 1999; Timimi, 2005;). There are usually a 
number of adverse side-effects reported by studies and children themselves 
depending on the type of medication, including a flattening of emotional affect 
(the zombie effect), confusion, irritability, a reduction in socialisation and play, 
stereotyped behaviour, growth restriction, insomnia, headaches, or dizziness 
(Breggin, 2001; Timimi, 2005). Baldwin (2000) asserts that: “The supposedly 
desirable behavioural effects of, for example, ADHD medication (including 
passivity and reduced spontaneity) are the primary toxic effects of 
psychostimulants” (p. 457, emphasis in original).  
Staying with an ADHD example, research on children’s experience of medication 
found that many children viewed medication as “changing who they were” and 
reported a considerable stigma with its use (Kendall, Hatton, Beckett & Leo, 
2003; Meaux, Hester, Smith & Shoptaw, 2006; Singh, Keenan & Mears, 2008). 
Interestingly then, when another study (McElearney, Fitzpatrick, Farrell, King & 
Lynch, 2005) compared children’s experience of medication for ADHD and 
physical illness (epilepsy), the findings revealed stigma and shame associated 
with ADHD but not epilepsy medication use, suggesting moral verdicts 
associated with the use of psychiatric medication. Moreover, stimulant drugs are 
recognised to be highly addictive, raising concerns about their widespread abuse 
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(Baldwin, 2000). For example, stimulants are one of the most frequently sold 
street drugs (Breggin & Breggin, 1995). 
1.4.3.  Power and consent 
Newnes (2011, p. 221, emphasis in original) argues that children receiving 
mental health services commonly obtain “little or no relevant and understandable 
information about the reasons for their referral to a clinical psychologist”. He 
suggests that the widely endorsed option of choice is therefore frequently 
ignored. Another concern is that children are regularly referred to mental health 
services without consent and invaded without consent through injections of 
psychotropic drugs to manage their behaviour in inpatient units (Newnes, 2013a). 
Dexter, Larkin and Newnes (2011) noted that children are disempowered in multi-
faceted ways when they enter mental health services, given their age and social 
status, for example. Consequently, there is a considerable power imbalance 
between the child and the psychologist. The impact of such power differences are 
likely to be greatest where children are subject to compulsory compliance with 
assessments or treatments, including psychological therapies (BPS, 2008b, p. 5). 
Understanding and reflecting on power dynamics is an important step towards 
achieving ethical standards of care in contemporary psychology (Fish, 1999). 
1.4.4.  Other issues related to clinical practice with children  
Clinical psychologists working with children use a broad range of interventions, 
which follow different theoretical models (e.g., systemic, psychodynamic, 
narrative, cognitive and behavioural) as well as different forms of treatment 
delivery (e.g., direct therapeutic work and indirect consultative work). However, 
even when using alternative approaches as part of an ‘eclectic’ position, clinical 
psychologists still work alongside psychiatrists and report progress to them. 
Moreover, whilst there has certainly been some recognition of the importance of 
working on a more systemic, community and political level (e.g., Harris, 2005), 
clinical psychology seems not to have moved far from internal deficit-based 
conceptualisations. For example, this is evident in the current Children and 
Young People’s Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT, 2011) 
Project’s emphasis on Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), an approach that 
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aims to modify dysfunctional thoughts residing in the individual child.  
Furthermore, the NICE guidelines, journals and textbooks reviewing treatments 
for children, such as ‘What works for whom?’ by Fonagy and colleagues (2005), 
heavily rely on medical and positivist discourses. In this way, they often present 
psychological therapies as evidence-based interventions, which address specific 
childhood psychiatric disorders. Regardless of all the controversy, the BPS has 
welcomed a new government strategy to invest £32 million in IAPT for children 
and young people with mental health problems (BPS, 2011).  
Additionally, despite concerns with medication, it is common to offer drugs to 
complement psychological therapy in practice with children. The NICE guidelines 
(2009) and other clinical guides, such as ‘Drawing on evidence - Advice for 
mental health professionals working with children and adolescents’ (Wolpert et 
al., 2006) in fact recommend medication as the first line of intervention for ADHD. 
They also advise other physical treatments for a variety of other psychiatric 
conditions, including psychostimulants, lithium or traditional anti-psychotic 
medication to reduce “antisocial behaviours in children and adolescents with co-
morbid ADHD/ADD”, to reduce “explosive aggressive outbursts in hospitalised 
groups” (Wolpert et al., 2006, p. 9). 
Thus mainstream child psychology, which claims to offer alternatives to bio-
medical discourses, appears to have gone along with psychiatry and together 
they have built a system that hardly does justice to the myriad of difficulties it 
claims to address, whilst producing multiple iatrogenic problems for those to 
whom it is applied (Rapley et al., 2011, p. 1).  
1.4.5.  Organisational issues and individual psychologists 
The practice of all the participants in this study is based within a wider 
organisational context, which, as we have seen, is largely influenced by the 
medical model. This may present numerous issues and dilemmas for 
psychologists and their practice. For example, there seems to be ethical 
concerns with such practices as diagnosing children, which psychologists 
encounter every day since they are enshrined in their institutional contexts. 
Moreover, individual psychologists often practice within multidisciplinary teams, 
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discourses of which will be influenced by different and often polarised theoretical 
positions and the personal perspectives of individuals. This includes not only 
medical, but also psychological, social, humanistic, liberal or post-modern, 
suggesting that professionals may need to negotiate between these. 
As a modern profession, child clinical psychology is firmly integrated within the 
pay and bureaucratic structures of the NHS (Newnes, 2013a). As such, the 
practice of individual psychologists is directly regulated by the DOH that sets 
requirements for all NHS-commissioned child services nationally. One of the 
recent requirements asks CAMHS to report on their performance and submit a 
variety of mandatory information on a yearly basis, including categories of 
provisional diagnosis, primary diagnosis and outcome measures (DOH, 2012). 
This might have significant consequences for the practice of individual 
psychologists. For example, as we have seen, the evidence-base for work with 
children tends to be organised in relation to a biomedical discourse. Authors of 
clinical guidelines argue that while the clustering of problems within the 
diagnostic framework is not ideal, it is the only way to keep it close to the 
evidence, which is required within the current socio-economic climate and the 
business model in the NHS. The argument being that the diagnosis results in a 
care package, which subsequently attracts much needed funding from local 
commissioners. The result is that the NHS has increasingly focused on those 
interventions that have the most well-established evidence base. From the above 
it appears that the profession and its members are in danger of becoming 
trapped in a medicalised system, as the powerful psychiatric language 
increasingly organises clinical practice guidelines and services. 
 
1.5.  PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTS 
In this section I will review studies that have undertaken a qualitative exploration 
of clinical psychologists’ as well as other professionals’ accounts of their practice. 
1.5.1.  Studies of other professionals’ accounts of their practice 
Five qualitative studies are of a particular relevance to this thesis. Most of these 
studies adopted different methodologies and explored different elements of the 
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clinical practice of a range of professionals. However, two studies have some key 
aspects in common and reported similar findings. Namely, an Australian study by 
Koehne, Hamilton, Sands and Humphrey (2012) and a Canadian study by 
Strong, Gaete, Sametband, French & Eeson (2012) both examined how clinicians 
are influenced by, and respond to, the use of diagnosis in their practice. Strong 
and colleagues (2012) analysed the data from an online survey of 116 
professionals, a website blog, and interviews with 10 professionals using a 
grounded theory method, and Koehne and colleagues (2012) conducted a 
discourse analysis of interviews with 23 clinicians working in CAMHS about their 
use of the Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) diagnosis. Although using 
different methods of data analysis, the findings of both studies suggested that 
diagnosing can pose considerable practical and ethical dilemmas for clinicians 
applying non-psychiatric approaches in their work.  
These studies outlined various strategies that clinicians used to deal with such 
dilemmas. Specifically, Strong et al. (2012) found that clinicians reported 
complying with administrative requirements by giving all clients ‘unspecified’ DSM 
diagnosis. The clinicians also reported using diagnostic language with their 
psychiatric colleagues, while in the therapy room they preferred the clients’ 
language to describe their presenting concerns, and reported a more 
collaborative practice, which involved negotiating, exploring and choosing 
diagnoses with their clients. Koehne et al. (2012) found that practitioners reported 
managing their dilemmas around diagnosing young people with BPD either by 
not disclosing the diagnosis to their clients or by reframing the diagnosis with 
young people whilst positioning themselves carefully when disclosing a 
diagnosis. This was achieved by postponing the claims of diagnostic 
permanency, and by drawing upon qualifying language to establish their sceptical 
position towards the diagnosis. Thus, whilst these studies identified different 
strategies, they both conclude that clinicians could be seen to show resistance to, 
or even the subversion of, diagnostic practice. 
Another study by Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi and Clarke (2009) explored accounts of 
twenty UK professionals involved in childhood genetic testing. Using rhetorical 
discourse analysis, they too looked at the dimensions of ethical and professional 
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dilemmas. However, in contrast to the above studies, this research focused on 
the management of moral accountability in describing professional actions. The 
authors found that the most significant devices through which this accountability 
was managed included a contrast structure and the use of extreme case 
scenarios. For example, constructing parents as “pushy” and “demanding” tests 
and the child as “innocent” and “declining” (Arribas-Ayllon, et al., 2009, p. 29). 
These functioned to justify professional actions and facilitated the management of 
the moral positioning in assigning responsibility and blame.  
A similar perspective on the professionals accounts to the one offered by Arribas-
Ayllon and colleagues (2009) was provided in a British study by Masocha 
published in March 2013 that explored professional accountability of twenty-five 
social workers who were interviewed about their practice with asylum seekers. 
The findings illuminated a range of discursive strategies employed by social 
workers to justify their practice, including attributing responsibility and blame to 
asylum-seeking families who were portrayed as “not making enough effort”, and 
emphasising existing constraints to good practice. Moreover, the interviewees 
portrayed themselves as “competent” social workers, “having the best intentions” 
and “doing the best they can” to support their clients. This research thus 
complements some of the above studies by offering an insight into the moral, 
ethical and ideological dilemmas related to professional practice. 
The final research described in this section is a study by Stevens and Harper 
(2007), which is distinct from the above studies in that it used discourse analysis 
to examine accounts of eight mental health professionals (psychiatrists, 
anaesthetists and psychiatric nurses) who were interviewed about their 
experience of administering the socially contested psychiatric intervention of 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) in adult patients. Their research identified how 
clinicians drew on a repertoire that constructed people receiving ECT as severely 
ill which had a powerful effect to warrant the urgent use of ECT and other 
biomedical interventions, to define who should receive ECT, to reframe distress 
in organic terms, and to discount the usefulness of alternative, non-physical 
interventions. Their findings also demonstrated that all the interviewees 
acknowledged concerns about ECT and managed these, for example, by 
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constructing ECT as a method with compared risks and benefits, downplaying 
potential problems with its evidence base, and undermining the legitimacy of 
criticism.  
1.5.2.  Studies of clinical psychologists’ accounts of their practice 
There appears to be a limited number of studies that examined clinical 
psychologists’ accounts of their work. These are mainly unpublished doctorate 
theses that used a Foucaldian discourse analysis (FDA) to explore a range of 
topics such as clinical psychologists’ constructions of an old age, gender, 
poverty, or their work with refugees. Only two studies analysed accounts of child 
clinical psychologists. Whilst these used the same methodology (i.e., FDA), they 
focused on very different aspects of clinical practice with children, drawing 
different conclusions, and therefore will be outlined separately. 
The first study by Skoger, Linberg and Magnusson (2011) looked at Swedish 
child psychologists’ accounts of their practice to explore the meaning of gender. 
The authors identified four different repertoires at work: a repertoire of neutrality 
and equal treatment, grounded in a liberal political concept of equality; an 
individualising repertoire concentrating on individual differences and symptoms, 
rather than the influence of context on children’s problems; a repertoire of 
gender-specific characteristics, emphasising fundamental internal variances 
between girls and boys as being central when judging what is normal; and a 
repertoire of gender-specific expectations. This research highlighted how the 
narratives often ended in accounts of individualising and symptom-focused 
treatments focused on gender-stereotypical adjustment to socially desired 
behaviors. 
In the second study by Dexter, Larkin and Newnes (2011), the authors presented 
an exploration of eight UK child clinical psychologists’ talk, with particular focus 
on their understanding of user involvement. The patterns of analysis outlined that 
children are regularly positioned as both vulnerable and powerless in comparison 
to parents and professionals. The authors suggested that this positioning of 
children has implications on how much they can be involved effectively in service 
evaluation and planning when parents may seem to be more straightforward 
candidates for user involvement within a busy CAMHS setting. 
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1.6.  SUMMARY AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CURRENT STUDY 
In the introductory section above, we see that there is complex moral ambiguity 
inherent in the construct of mental illness. This is evident not only through a 
critical examination of its emergence and relentless widening throughout the 
history, which highlighted political, economic and professional interests in its 
creation, but also in detailing the problems with the validity and reliability of 
psychiatric diagnoses, thus rendering claims of their scientific plausibility far from 
sound. By providing an overview of some of the issues with child clinical 
psychology practice that relies on the use of this contested psychiatric paradigm, 
it is sensible to argue that such practices are morally deeply problematic. This 
raises a question about whether the profession and its members might be in 
danger of becoming trapped in a medicalised system, as the power of psychiatric 
diagnostic language increasingly organises clinical practice guidelines and 
services. 
From a social constructionist perspective, which this thesis adopts (as discussed 
in detail in the section 2.2.), the ways in which phenomena are discursively 
constructed make a material difference to the very nature of those phenomena. 
As such, the ways in which clinical psychologists construct their practice is crucial 
to the delivery of mental health services to children and has a direct impact on 
the lives of children and their families.  
This inherent power of psychological discourses as exercised by clinical 
psychologists (e.g., Boyle, 2011; Billington, 2006) raises a fundamental question 
as to how they go about their work. In my opinion this is particularly relevant to 
child clinical psychologists, given that children have little power in society in 
general and in mental health services in particular (Dexter, Larkin & Newnes, 
2011). Working in a CAMHS context might therefore present various issues for 
clinical psychologists in how they talk about, and how they listen to, children as 
well as how (and whether) they listen to themselves when working with children. 
Researchers rarely target clinical psychologists’ accounts of their work, as they 
can be easily found in textbooks and journals. However, such textual accounts 
would be significantly different from interviews with clinicians, which have the 
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potential to provide conversationally richer data. In addition, Newnes (2013a) 
argues that there is considerable difficulty in examining clinical psychology 
practice because the clinical work mostly takes place away from public gaze and 
it is only through reporting about the work in supervision or team meetings that 
the practice is made visible. As such, the semi-structured interviews conducted in 
this study offer psychologists a chance to discuss their work in greater detail, to 
explore the range of concerns that they might have about their practice, to offer 
descriptions of, and justifications for, some of their actions, as well as establish 
their personal and professional identity.  
By utilising the fine-grained DP analysis, this study hopes to provide an additional 
perspective for analysing and understanding the current practice. Such a 
perspective, as we saw in the review of extant research, is largely undeveloped 
within child clinical psychology and research examining clinical psychology 
practice. Therefore, this study hopes to make a contribution to both theory and 
practice by specifying in greater detail the ways in which practitioners 
conceptualise their activities. It is also hoped that this may help clinical 
psychologists gain a greater awareness of the performative nature of their 
language, and thus potentially enhance both practitioners’ critical reflectivity and 
reflexivity. 
 
1.7.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
It is common in traditional psychological research to formulate a clear research 
question before starting the research. However, within discursive psychology 
approaches, rather than posing a specific research question, the focus is often on 
explicating the workings of specific type of social practice operating in the setting, 
perhaps with the ultimate aim of making broader sense of the setting as a whole. 
This means that questions are continually refined in the course of the analytic 
process (Potter, 2012).  
Accordingly, this research started with a broad question asking how clinical 
psychologists talk about their work with children. As I became increasingly 
engaged with the data, focusing on the rhetorical and interactional aspects of the 
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discourse, the analytic foci developed. This thesis therefore looks at clinical 
psychologists’ orientations towards, and justifications for, the challengeable 
status of the various practices that they described in their talk. A more detailed 
discussion of the methodology will follow in the next chapter. 
 
CHAPTER TWO - METHODOLOGY 
This chapter provides an outline of the epistemological position and 
methodological approach adopted in the study. This is followed by a detailed 
description of the method used, including sampling, participant recruitment and 
profile, data collection, transcription and the approach to analysis. The chapter 
concludes with an account of my positioning in the context of this study. I have 
provided a critical review of the study and further reflection on my position in the 
final chapter. 
 
2.1.  METHODOLOGICAL RATIONALE 
This research aims to investigate how clinical psychologists construct their work 
with children and account for their practices. Accordingly, there are two related 
implications for choosing the methodology for this study. First, the interest of the 
study is clearly not in measuring, comparing or predicting quantifiable variables 
nor asking people to rate themselves on a scale, but rather in exploring the 
details of their talk. This is best facilitated by using qualitative methods (Harper, 
2012). Second, since the concern is with how participants use language to 
describe and account for their practices within the occasioned talk-in-interaction, 
a discourse analytical, and more specifically discursive psychological 
methodological approach, was considered to be the most appropriate. 
 
2.2.  EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITION 
Methods and analytic perspectives are typically underpinned by broader 
philosophical principles and assumptions (Potter, 2003). This study adopts a 
social constructionist approach to exploring how clinical psychologists draw upon 
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language to construct their work with children. Gergen (1985) outlined some 
basic assumptions of social constructionism, including: 
• Scepticism of the taken-for-granted knowledge claims about the world; 
• Versions of knowledge and reality are historically and culturally specific,  
• reified through particular socially occasioned processes, and  
• bound up with and carrying social actions. 
More specifically and in line with my methodological commitments, I will have 
aligned myself with a relativist brand of social constructionism, which is 
sometimes called ‘radical’/‘strong’ social constructionism (Harper, 2012), 
‘discursive constructionism’ (Potter & Hepburn, 2008) or ‘discursive psychological 
social constructionism’ (Rapley, 2004). This relativist position insists that “realities 
are always realities becoming” (Mehan & Wood, 1975, p. 32), which brings to the 
fore notions of haecceity and indexicality (Rapley, 2012). According to Rapley 
(2012, p. 182), the recognisable structures of social reality are not fixed but rather 
constantly and collectively brought into being in their uniqueness as what they 
are (haecceity) within the local occasion of their use in (inter)action (indexicality).  
Relativism/discursive constructionism is a practical position that is productive in 
research terms in that it views language as actively constructing the notions of 
the world rather than merely reflecting or mirroring them (e.g., Potter, 1996). 
Proponents of this perspective are pervasively sceptical of any guarantee about 
the nature of ‘reality’ or ‘mind’ that is independent of local descriptions of them. 
For researchers this means that they are interested in the viewable, verifiable and 
accountable, that is, they treat people’s accounts as analytic start-points 
themselves, rather than focusing on invisible, hypothetical and abstract concepts, 
with which we cannot be in direct contact. Also, multiple interpretations or 
readings of data are to be expected. 
This approach is commonly confronted by the advocates of what is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘weak’ or a more ‘critical realist’ end of the realism-relativism 
constructionist continuum, who point to the undeniable reality of rock, furniture, 
death or macro-social contexts of institutions and power relations within which 
any discourse takes place (Edwards, 1997, p. 52). Thus they accuse discursive 
psychological social constructionists of ontological and moral relativism (Harper, 
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2012). 
However, the relativist perspective does not necessarily propose a denial of the 
objective reality of phenomena, which would be “as realist a move as endorsing 
that reality”2 (Potter, 2003, p. 787). Harper (2012) further clarifies this standpoint 
and notes that researchers who are epistemologically or methodologically 
relativist, are not necessarily ontologically relativist. In other words, “they are 
relativist about what we can know about the world but they are not relativist about 
whether there is a world at all…An epistemological relativist goes about their life 
in the same way as everyone else, treating the world as if it exists” (Harper, 2012, 
p. 91). 
Similarly, arguing that there are different interpretations of the world does not 
necessarily imply moral relativism or accepting that ‘anything goes’ (Hepburn, 
2003, p. 9). In fact, researchers using the variant of discursive constructionism 
have produced numerous works that highlighted ethically troubling social and 
political issues (e.g., Coulter & Rapley, 2011; Hepburn, 2000, 2001; Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992; Rapley, 2004). This project similarly hopes to do so by conducting a 
detailed analysis of professional talk.  
 
2.3.  DISCOURSE ANALYSIS  
The approach adopted in this study can be conceptualised under the umbrella 
term discourse analysis (DA), which encompasses a broad collection of related 
but varied approaches (Edwards, 2004), such as Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
(FDA), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) or Discursive Psychology (DP). In 
general, DA approaches are aligned with social constructionism (Gergen, 2009), 
focus on the use of language (Willig, 2001), and provide a powerful resource for 
researchers who wish to question the status quo (Hepburn, 2003). The difference 
                                            
2 This reflects longstanding philosophical disputes between realism and relativism. In their ‘Death 
and Furniture’ paper Edwards, Ashmore & Potter (1995) skillfully argued that the very act of 
invoking material reality, such as tables and rocks (the reality that cannot be denied) and of 
various kinds of death, poverty and suffering (the reality that should not be denied), inevitably 
makes them representations in talks and texts analysable as constructions and rhetorical devices, 
thus exposing the way they were constructed to have their effect. Indeed, consistent with its 
epistemic assumptions, it can be argued that the discursive constructionist perspective is itself a 
literary construction (Potter & Hepburn, 2008). 
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between the various types of DA is in their assumptions, emphasis and methods 
of analysis3. 
The DP approach adopted in this study developed out of a particular strand of 
discourse analytic work outlined by Potter and Wetherell (1987). Its unique 
features were subsequently laid out by Edwards and Potter (1992) and later 
Potter (1996) and Edwards (1997). The project of DP is distinctive in applying DA 
principles specifically to psychological topics (concepts such as emotion or 
identity). These are, however, reconceptualised as discursive practices rather 
than treated as fixed psychological facts, cognitive processes or inner mental 
states. In other words, DP views discourse to be actively constitutive of the 
subjects of psychology, and treats psychology as a topic rather than a resource 
(Edwards, 2004; Edwards & Potter, 1992, 2001; Rapley, 2004). Moreover, DP 
focuses on the way psychology is a public and social endeavour, and how it is 
co-constructed and used in social practices. Thus, DP has presented some of the 
most rigorous critiques of the dominant, traditional ways of doing psychology, 
including the notions of individualism and cognitivism (e.g., Hepburn & Wiggins, 
2007). 
Another important distinction noted by Potter & Hepburn (2008) is that DP 
assumes a more restricted notion of discourse4, in comparison to the extended 
notion of discourse commonly used in FDA. These authors assert that this, 
however, does not mean that the type of analytic work done in DP might not draw 
on some of Foucault’s observations about institutions and practice. Similarly, DP 
satisfies many of the essential characteristics of CDA, for example, by its 
involvement in critical and political analysis (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007, p. 13).  
The DP approach was used in this study because of its potential to map out the 
complex rhetorical work employed by the participants (e.g., management of stake 
and accountability) and to get a better understanding of the micro-mechanisms of 
the production and re-production of practices that tend to be glossed over by 
other DA approaches with a more ‘macro’ focus on the discourse (Whittle & 
                                            
3 For an overview of differing discourse analytic commitments, see e.g., Edwards (2004), Harper 
(2006), Hepburn & Wiggins (2007), or Wooffitt (2005).  
4 Discourse is defined in DP as texts and talk as parts of social practices (Potter, 1996).	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Mueller, 2011). Indeed, Potter and Hepburn (2009) assert that such a detailed 
level of analysis is essential for understanding the production of institutional 
order. 
 
2.4.  DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
DP has also been increasingly informed by conversation analysis (CA) developed 
by Harvey Sacks (1989, 1992) who was himself influenced by ethnomethodology 
(EM) founded by Harold Garfinkel (1967). This EM/CA inspired DP approach 
allows detailed analysis of interactional practices to expose “the seen but 
unnoticed” aspects (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 180) of how the things are accomplished 
(e.g., how practices are justified) by ordinary members of society (including the 
psychologists5) to create the commonsensical notions of everyday (in this case 
professional) life and cultural knowledge (Heritage, 1984; Sacks, 1984).  
The analytic perspective of DP typically draws on three key features of discourse, 
which overlap considerably with basic assumptions of both CA and EM6 (see 
Edwards & Potter, 2001; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007). The first aspect is the 
action-orientation of discourse, which emphasises that talk around a given topic, 
such as psychologists’ practice, accomplishes certain social actions. That is, in 
speaking we construct versions of events in order to achieve certain interpersonal 
objectives (for example, to attribute blame or refute responsibility) and to manage 
our own stake and interest7 (Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996). Thus, as 
psychologists provide reports of their practices that describe issues of 
accountability in those practices so, concurrently, they are inevitably 
demonstrating and managing their own accountability in the provision of the 
                                            
5 This approach does not assume that psychological knowledge is of an inherently different order 
to that of the ordinary person (Baker, 2003, p. 396). 
6 The relationship between DP, EM and CA is complex. For more elaborate coverage of 
methodological developments and their interrelation see e.g., Hepburn & Wiggins (2007) or 
Wooffitt (2005). 
7 Potter (1996) clarifies that “the argument is not that social researchers should interpret people’s 
discourse in terms of their individual or group interests … [which would be a cognitivist move. 
Rather] … The argument here is that people treat each other in this way. They treat reports and 
descriptions as if they come from groups and individuals with interests, desires, ambitions and 
stake in some versions of what the world is like. Interests are participants’ concern, and that is 
how they can enter analysis.” (Potter, 1996, p. 110; emphasis in original). 	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report.  
Second, DP understands discourse as situated. It is sequential, such as any 
utterance within conversation follows on and orients to the previous 
conversational turn, whilst the new utterance provides the context for what is said 
next. Discourse is also situated institutionally, in the sense that institutional 
activities (e.g., doing the research interview) and identities (clinical psychologist 
or researcher) will be relevant to what happens. However, the context should not 
automatically be assumed by the analyst; rather it needs to be made pertinent by 
the participants themselves by the way they invoke and reconstruct contextual 
structures in the course of their talk (Schegloff, 1997). Finally, discourse is 
situated rhetorically (Billig, 1991). That is, constructions in talk are frequently 
formed in a way that counter or undermine potentially significant alternatives. 
Third, consistent with its epistemological assumptions, DP treats discourse as 
both socially constructed (how are accounts assembled in social interaction?) 
and constructive (how do accounts build versions of the worlds/events/actors in 
order to accomplish social action?). DP is therefore interested in both how people 
employ specific constructions and with what effects.  
In this study, I will draw on the above notions to demonstrate the ways in which 
psychologists describe and account for their practices with children. I will pay 
particular attention to the complex set of conversational moves in psychologists’ 
talk and the management of accountability and identity work within the local 
context of the talk-in-interaction. Although psychologists inevitably orient to their 
stake in describing any of their practices (Antaki, Ardévol, Núñez & Vayreda, 
2005), it would be expected that the accounting and identity work is the most 
pervasive was when they talk about the potentially controversial and morally 
contested practices, given that speakers tend to orient to implicit problems when 
accounting for events (Widdicombe, 1993). This raises the broader issue of how 
psychologists construct their work with children as part of making moral sense of 
their practice. Antaki et al. (2005) put this concisely: 
“The idea is that in any interaction, participants do things for which an 
account might, in principle, be called for and given; things that 'make 
sense' interactionally and in the moral order. This is not an analyst's 
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fiction; it is visible in the behaviour of participants themselves, as they 
design their talk and actions so as to avoid, or disarm, query or 
challenge. Participants sometimes orient very visibly to the 
challengeable status of what they are doing (e.g., in such formulae as 
'this may be a funny question, but...' or 'I'm not a racist, but...'), but can 
(and routinely do) exploit more subtle aspects of talk in interaction to 
address, disarm, or flaunt their accountability” (p. 2, emphasis in 
original). 
The analysis therefore focuses on sequences of talk where psychologists orient 
to particularly sensitive areas of interactional concern, with the aim to 
demonstrate how discourse can be used to do the work of moral accounting and 
how it can be used to work up moral credibility. It is hoped that through a fine-
grained analysis of psychologists’ accounts, it will be possible to make inferences 
about the cultural properties of the moral and social world (Schegloff, 1998), in 
this case clinical psychological practice with children.  
 
2.5.  ETHICS 
Ethical approval was sought and obtained from the University of East London 
Research Ethics Committee8. NHS ethical approval was not required to interview 
NHS staff because they are not considered vulnerable within the current ethical 
policies. Standard ethics protocols were followed, including gaining informed 
consent from participants, adhering to confidentiality arrangements, and 
protecting the anonymity of participants. All names and identifiers have therefore 
been changed. Participants were informed that they may withdraw their decision 
to take part in the study at any time without consequence and obligation to give a 
reason. 
 
2.6.  SAMPLE SIZE AND GENERALISABILITY 
As with other DP projects and in contrast with quantitative psychological research 
                                            
8 See appendix one. 
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rooted in statistical and aggregationist models (McHoul, 2001; Rapley, 2012), the 
approach to sampling in this study follows the position of the quantum physicist, 
Richard Feynman, who suggests that: “Nature uses only the longest threads to 
weave her patterns, so each small piece of her fabric reveals the organisation of 
the entire tapestry” (Feynman, 1965, p. 34). Accordingly, the question of sufficient 
sample size becomes moot, because the order we are seeking here is not 
statistical in character; rather it is inherently present even in the tiniest fragments 
of materials we have available. This notion was coined the ‘order at all points’ by 
Sacks (1992). Schegloff succinctly outlines Sacks’ position: 
 “This view … understands order not to be present only at aggregate 
levels and therefore subject to an overall differential distribution, but to 
be present in detail on a case by case, environment by environment 
basis. A culture is not then to be found only by aggregating all of its 
venues; it is substantially present in each of its venues.” (Schegloff in 
Sacks, 1992, xlvi) 
Consequently, there are at least two associated implications for this study 
regarding to the representativeness of data and the generalisability of its claims. 
First, important insights can be gained from what might, from a positivistic 
viewpoint, be deemed to be a relatively statistically insignificant sample size. 
Second, if certain discursive practices are revealed in a detailed study of a small 
sample of talk-in-interaction, it can sensibly be assumed that this also reveals 
something of the wider cultural practices. Thus, exploration of the kind of moral 
accounting located within the talk-in-interaction, may also say something about 
the wider moral order.  
 
2.7.  PARTICIPANT SELECTION CRITERIA AND RECRUITMENT 
The exploratory nature of this study highlighted the value of approaching a range 
of child clinical psychologists. Therefore, a broad cross-sectional approach to 
selecting participants was used in order to elicit the widest possible variety of 
potentially interesting avenues of inquiry. Participants had to be qualified clinical 
psychologists working with children in NHS-provided mental health services. 
There were no other specific inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
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Given the time constrains for completion of this study, a multi-level strategy of 
recruitment was adopted. Firstly, the heads of Child and Adolescent Mental 
Health Services (CAMHS) in London were approached to discuss the outline of 
the study and to obtain approval for the study to be carried out within their 
service. They were sent an invitation letter,9 supplied with a participant 
information sheet,10 and were asked for this to be distributed throughout their 
teams. Psychologists were asked to contact the researcher if they were 
interested in participating. Five participants were recruited in this way. Secondly, 
an advert11 was placed on the research board within the British Psychological 
Society's Division of Clinical Psychology. No participants were recruited via this 
route. Finally, the snowballing technique was used by approaching clinical 
psychologists working in CAMHS who were already known to me. They were 
invited to participate, sent a participant information sheet, and asked in turn to 
invite other clinical psychologists they knew to participate to whom they also 
distributed the information sheet, and so on. Four participants were recruited in 
this way. 
Potential participants were usually approached via email, although occasional 
follow-up telephone calls were also made. During the initial contact, basic 
information was gathered to assess if the participant met the inclusion criteria 
discussed above. Participants had an opportunity to ask questions if they had 
any. Arrangements for a mutually convenient time and location of the interviews 
were made at this stage.  
 
2.8.  PROFILE OF PARTICIPANTS 
Participants constituted nine qualified clinical psychologists working with children 
in NHS-provided mental health services. Seven females and two males were 
recruited. Two participants were aged between 26-35 years, six participants 
between 36-45 years, and one participant between 46-55 years. Seven 
participants were White-British, and the remaining two described themselves as 
                                            
9 See appendix two. 
10 See appendix three. 
11 See appendix four.	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White-Asian and White-Other. The psychologists worked in a variety of CAMHS 
settings, including Tiers 2, 3 and 4, and one learning disability service. Their work 
locations spread across the North, South, East and West areas of London. The 
number of years since qualification ranged from 1 to 18 years. Participants 
formed a mix with regard to theoretical orientation and speciality, often describing 
themselves as applying more than one therapeutic approach, including cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT); systemic; psychodynamic; group analytic; cognitive-
analytic therapy (CAT); mentalisation-based therapy (MBT); and eye movement 
desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) therapy. Some specialised in working 
with adolescents, trauma, parenting, attachment theory or Autistic Spectrum 
Disorders (ASD) assessment, whilst others described themselves as having an 
integrative or generic CAMHS orientation. Table 1 in Appendix five provides a 
summary of participants’ demographic details.  
 
2.9.  INTERVIEWS 
Child clinical psychologists were chosen to be interviewed because the objective 
of this study was to look at how they describe their work, to explore the range of 
concerns that they might have about their practice, and to see how they argued 
and accounted for these. This decision was made with an awareness that several 
authors (e.g., Potter & Hepburn, 2005; Potter & Mulkay, 1985) have highlighted 
limitations of using interviews as a data collection method in DP studies. One of 
the main criticisms is that it creates an ‘unnatural’ type of interaction, and 
therefore should not be used as a substitution for more 'naturally occurring' talk.  
On this basis it can be argued that for the purposes of this research, I could have 
recorded more naturally occurring interactions by attending case conferences, for 
example. However, as Potter and Mulkay pointed out: “The very artificiality of 
interviews may be their main advantage and provide their best justification.” 
(Potter & Mulkay, 1985, p. 269). Accordingly, the research interview was 
considered an appropriate method, because it allowed me to take a more 
interventionist approach (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and explore instances of talk 
about the areas of clinical practice that would otherwise have been difficult to 
collect in naturally occurring talk, given the logistical and time constraints for this 
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study.  
Despite the critiques, research interviews remain thoroughly analysable 
(Edwards, 2004, p. 270), and can address important issues (Hepburn, 2000; 
Wetherell & Edley, 1999). Baker (2003, p. 396) asserts that if the interviews are 
treated not so much as methods of getting at information or retrieving 
participants’ views (although participants often orient to them in this way), but 
more as in-their-own-right-analysable instances of talk-in-interaction, they can 
yield insight about a range of matters, such as the production of situated 
identities and the moral work of accounting. 
As such, it is important to stress that the interviews in this study did not depict the 
ways psychologists may interact in real life by extrapolating the participants’ 
views that would somehow mirror their actual practice. Rather, the interviews 
were treated as co-constructed locally occasioned research interactions, and 
designed to be open-ended and conversational. This meant that there was no 
assumption of my neutralist stance as a researcher; instead I adopted an active 
interviewing style (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997), in which the topics were fluidly 
followed and participants’ contributions were at times challenged in order to 
generate a wider range of discursive practices. Such an approach to interviewing 
is common in DP studies (e.g., Hepburn, 2000, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Conceptualised in this way, this study looks at what 
happens when a trainee clinical psychologist starts asking some qualified clinical 
psychologists about their work within the research context. From a DP 
perspective, this study therefore is interested in the management of 
accountability that such questioning might produce. 
A total of nine conversational interviews were conducted. The interviews were 
guided by an interview schedule,12 and started with a broad opening question: 
“Can you tell me how do you work with children?” The interviews ranged in length 
from 47 minutes to 123 minutes, with an average of 65 minutes. Natural endings 
in interviews were agreed between participants and myself. Each interview was 
recorded using two digital recorders. All interviews took place in the respective 
participants’ work places at times convenient to them. Prior to the interview, 
                                            
12 See appendix six. 
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participants were asked to sign a consent form,13 to complete a demographic 
profile form,14 and confidentiality arrangements were explained. There was an 
opportunity for participants to ask questions about the research at the beginning 
and the end of the interview, and reflect on their experience of the interview 
process. 
 
2.10.  TRANSCRIPTION 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim using a variety of notation symbols 
commonly used in CA, based on a variation of the Jefferson system15 (see e.g., 
Atkinson & Heritage, 1984). This simplified convention16 was designed to capture 
features considered most essential for the current analytic task (Hollway, 2005; 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This convention facilitated readability whilst also 
allowing me to capture more fine-grained features of the talk-in-interaction, such 
as overlap, emphasis, pauses, and contextual information. All identifying details 
were altered or omitted to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. Interviewees are 
identified by a pseudonym.  
 
2.11.  ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE  
The variant of DP used here is broadly associated with the Loughborough 
University’s School of Social Sciences.17 However, I have also drawn on, and 
followed, the procedures for analysing discourse suggested in the more classic 
texts of Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Wetherell and Potter (1992). In addition, 
I attended the Loughborough’s Discourse and Rhetoric Group (DARG) where I 
took some of my data (that are not presented in this thesis) prior to conducting 
my analysis to practice how to conduct a DP analysis, and to get a better 
understanding of the data from an interactional point of view (i.e., focusing on the 
process and the action orientation of talk rather than the content).  
                                            
13 See appendix seven. 
14 See appendix eight. 
15 See appendix nine for the transcription notation. 
16 This type of transcription convention is sometimes referred to as ‘Jefferson-Lite’. See Potter & 
Hepburn (2005, p. 8) for a debate regarding challenges and benefits of its use. 
17 This type of DP is associated with micro-level analysis and a relativist position.	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Whilst it is recognised that there is no distinct method to discourse analysis and 
that the analytic process is iterative, it is nevertheless possible to describe 
different phases of analysis.  
2.11.1.  Reading 
The first phase included the reading and re-reading of printed transcripts. During 
this preliminary reading stage, I noted my initial observations in the margins of 
the transcripts, marking points that were interesting either in terms of what was 
said, or how it was said. Whilst doing this, I asked myself a number of questions 
such as, ‘What might be the effect of particular accounts on the interaction or 
what are the participants doing in their talk?’ Being familiar with other discursive 
psychology studies was particularly beneficial in helping me to recognise 
discursive features already depicted in other work. 
2.11.2.  Coding and Initial Analysis 
The second stage involved coding and initial analysis to make examination of 
transcripts more manageable. This involved going through my comments in the 
margins and identifying interesting themes and actions produced in talk that could 
be grouped together. In this way, 14 themes/actions were identified and marked 
on the transcripts with coloured stickers.18 Those sections of the transcript that 
could be linked to one or more themes/actions were coded under several themes. 
The themes/actions were as follows: 
• Construction of children 
• Construction of difficulties/distress 
• Construction of psychologist role 
• Parental responsibility or blame 
• Child responsibility or blame 
• Expert versus lay knowledge 
• Power imbalance in child work 
• Rhetorical strategy of ‘doing being ordinary’ or ‘cover identity’ 
• Rhetorical strategy of ‘doing being collaborative or democratic’ 
• ‘Selling’ psychology 
                                            
18 See appendix ten for an illustration of coded transcripts. 
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• Good, morally adequate psychologist 
• Positive self and negative other 
• Justifying practices 
• Interview process 
After the initial coding process, I re-read those sections of discourse that related 
to each of the above categories separately, transferring them into separate word 
documents with correspondingly named files. Once printed, these became the 
subject of a detailed analysis of the discursive features that were present. In this 
step, I also colour highlighted those sections of discourse that provided 
examples, which related directly to the theme or where there was apparent 
rhetorical work being done. These then became the most suitable examples for 
potential inclusion in the study. 
2.11.3.  Selection of Extracts 
At this stage of the process it was essential to identify an analytical focus for the 
study. Although there were many areas of potential interest, such as participants’ 
constructions of children and their distress, I selected those sections of discourse 
where participants could be seen to be justifying and accounting for their practice, 
especially when they appeared to be orienting to issues of morals or areas of 
contestation. This decision was based on my view that these instances appeared 
to be particularly interesting, seemed to permeate a substantial amount of the 
research interaction, and were examples of a combination of related 
themes/actions, including ‘Justifying practices’, ‘Power imbalance in child work’, 
‘Rhetorical strategy of ‘doing being ordinary’ or ‘cover identity’, Rhetorical 
strategy of ‘doing being collaborative or democratic’, ‘Good, morally adequate 
psychologist’, and ‘Positive self-negative other’. 
The final extracts selected were based on how well they demonstrated 
participants’ orientation to moral accountability and subsequent justificatory 
rhetorical work. By doing so, I hoped to demonstrate some of the tensions and 
moral dilemmas around clinical psychologists’ practices with children. It is 
recognised that my choice in selecting or discarding extracts, will shape the 
conclusions drawn from this research and that this research is itself socially 
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constructed. 
2.11.4.  Analysis 
After selecting the most relevant sections of discourse, I examined each 
individual extract in greater detail, concentrating particularly on the use of 
discursive devices that I considered pertinent to understanding the talk-in-
interaction.19 A full account of the analysis is provided in the following chapter. 
 
2.12.  POSITIONING OF THE RESEARCHER  
Qualitative research should involve a degree of reflexivity about the researcher’s 
personal perspective, and how it may have impacted on the selection of topic and 
the research process generally (e.g., Burr, 2003). In terms of the development of 
this study, I was influenced by ideas from critical psychology, philosophy of 
relativism, and my passion for working with children. These interests grew out of 
my personal experience prior to starting a professional doctorate in clinical 
psychology, and were further developed over the course of my training at UEL. 
During my classes and in discussion with academics at UEL, I also became 
interested in discourse analysis, particularly discursive psychology, as well as 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, because of their questioning 
stance to social order and their potential to facilitate deconstructive readings of 
language.  
My experience of working in CAMHS prior to clinical psychology training and also 
recently on my child placements have fuelled my scepticism about the idea that 
children’s difficulties are best understood as mental illness. I have observed the 
role of social environments impacting on children’s lives, such as poor housing or 
being victims of neglect and abuse. Yet, it is often individual children in whom the 
problem is located and who remain the focus of the intervention along with their 
families. Through these observations, I have become increasingly critical of the 
medical model, which I think is particularly problematic when applied to children 
who have the least power in society.  
                                            
19 See appendix eleven for an example of a section of analysed transcript. 
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My position as a trainee clinical psychologist from the University of East London, 
and my reason for doing this research as a requirement for my qualification was 
made explicit in recruitment. While every effort was made not to lead participants’ 
thinking, I recognise that my own stance on the topic may have been conveyed at 
some level during the interviews, and could have had an impact on the data 
collected.  
In addition, I am aware that my identification with social constructionist and 
critical approaches to psychology have coloured my approach to data analysis, 
and that other researchers may offer a different reading of the data. For example, 
when engaging with the data I became increasingly interested in the ways that 
ethical issues were oriented to, and managed in, the interaction, which I have 
sought to demonstrate by the selection of the extracts for the final analysis. 
However, I hope that by including a variety of quotations, of which some included 
longer sequences of talk, readers will develop their own conclusions about the 
data, and give them the opportunity to inspect the conclusions that I have drawn.  
 
CHAPTER THREE - ANALYSIS 
In this chapter I present an analysis of the research interviews carried out with 
nine child clinical psychologists. The chapter starts with contextualising the talk 
by looking at the participants’ orienting to the interview requirements, as well as 
the professional and personal moral identities20 within the research interaction. 
Attention then shifts to the main part of the analysis that examines the strategies 
of accountability management in talking about practices depicted as potentially 
problematic. 
 
3.1.  CONTEXTUALISING THE TALK-IN-INTERACTION 
Several authors have highlighted the importance of delineating the relevant 
context and identity work in understanding the interview-talk (e.g., Leudar & 
Antaki, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Potter & Hepburn, 2012; T. Rapley, 2001). The key 
                                            
20 Identity is not conceptualised here in a traditional psychological sense as a fixed, internal 
‘entity’; rather, it is understood as a social and fluid construct. 
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question is, however, how much context is relevant and consequential for 
understanding what is going on in the interaction? Such a quandary is profound 
and difficult to resolve as exemplified by high profile debates on this issue (see 
Billig, 1999a, 1999b; McHoul, Rapley & Antaki, 2008; Schegloff, 1997, 1998, 
1999a, 1999b; Wetherell, 1998). 
In the analysis that follows, I will therefore pay attention to what I considered to 
be arguably the highly relevant and consequential notions of context and identity 
in understanding the business of talk in this study. To facilitate this task, I will pay 
attention to varying ‘footing’21 (e.g., Clayman, 1992; see also Goffman, 1981; 
Levinson, 1988), for example, shifts from ‘I’ to ‘we’. Marking footing can indicate 
who should be held accountable for the description and any potential inferences. 
I will also draw on Sacks’ (1992) conceptualisation of ‘identity’ in his work on 
‘category membership’. Sacks argues that identities are made relevant to a 
specific setting because of there being certain activities that are understood to 
get done in that setting. These membership categories are not held to be the 
immutable properties of people, but rather can be invoked, implied or mentioned 
within the context of particular interaction, and thus are much more permeable 
and occasioned. In the situation of this interview, the participants and I could be 
seen to shift between a range of identities according to the occasioned context of 
the talk, including the Interviewer + Interviewee, Trainee + Qualified Psychologist, 
and other possibly relevant identities. It is also of critical relevance that 
participants and I share the same professional background. 
It is also important to be aware of how the interview-talk is locally and 
collaboratively produced by both the interviewer and the interviewee (Leudar & 
Antaki, 1996a, 1996b; T. Rapley, 2001). I will therefore endeavour to provide 
relevant context from which the talk was produced, including my turns in so far as 
the word limit allows. Baker (1997) has noted that interviewers’ questions and the 
membership categories they implicitly invoke in their questions are vital to 
                                            
21 Potter and Hepburn (2005) caution that to define the footing can be a rather complex and 
complicated task in the interview interaction, as it is sometimes difficult to tease out exactly from 
what position the speakers are speaking, and consequently there may be different readings and 
different nuances of, for example, the pronoun ‘we’.  
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producing interviewees’ accounts. In the analysis that follows, I will attempt to 
show how the types of questions I ask invoke different versions of my identity. 
For example, I will illustrate how my position shifted between doing being a 
‘facilitative and neutral interviewer’ with the aim to encourage talk in a non-
leading way (T. Rapley, 2001), and how, at times, as a part of the conversation 
and as previously used in discursive psychology studies adopting interviews 
(e.g., Hepburn, 2000, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), I 
challenged participants’ contributions in order to generate a wider range of 
discursive practices.  
3.1.1.  Orienting to the research requirements 
Mazeland and ten Have (1996) argue that interview interaction tends to be 
organised around three requirements. First, interviewees orient to the fact that 
their task is to talk about their viewpoints and experiences. Second, interviewees 
have an awareness that within the interview setting they should provide answers 
to questions. Third, they understand that their accounts will contribute to a 
research project, will be used for analysis, and possibly also published. The 
authors assert that, based on these requirements, interviewees have the complex 
task of determining the right level of description: reporting their views whilst 
meeting the interviewer’s research needs. 
During the recruitment process participants were made aware that the study was 
being undertaken as a requirement for the researcher’s Doctoral Degree in 
Clinical Psychology at the University of East London, and that their task was 
going to be to talk about their work with children. The following two brief extracts 
taken from interview four and five are examples of participants’ orientation to the 
requirements that were placed upon them as part of participating in this research. 
Extract 1: KK/P4:22 Lines 2518-2519, p. 62 
2518 Liz:   Is that what you have been looking for? 
2519 Kat: Yeah..((recording stopped)) 
 
 
                                            
22 KK refers to me, P4 refers to the participant number four.  
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Extract 2: KK/P5: Lines 2129-2133, p. 53 
2129 Val: =But, eh (.) I hope there’s something there that 
2130  you can work with. 
2131 Kat: Yeah, okay ((both laugh)) I’m sure! Thank you so 
2132  much! 
2133 Val: A pleasure! 
Liz’s question “Is that what you have been looking for?” (line 2518) and Val’s 
statement “I hope there’s something there that you can work with” (line 2129) 
directly relate to both my identity as the ‘researcher‘ and the academic objective 
of the research interview. Their turns therefore function to underline the 
expectations placed upon them as interviewees who were to provide me with the 
required information. The very fact that Liz asks me to evaluate her performance 
in this respect reveals of her orientation that I could be somebody who might be 
in position to evaluate her performance in this interview. 
3.1.2.  Orienting to personal and professional moral identity 
Many authors highlighted that interview talk places moral demands on speakers 
who endeavour to present themselves in a morally adequate light (e.g., Baruch, 
1981; Buttny, 1993; Mazeland & ten Have, 1996; Silverman, 1985; T. Rapley, 
2001).  
In her book the ‘Categorization and the Moral Order’, Jayyusi (1984) suggested 
that categories of persons are routinely bound up with moral assessment of 
performance of the duties that are related to a particular category. She noted that 
for specific categories, the fulfilment of these duties is a necessary prerequisite 
for category membership:  
“…For some categories X, not only does the displayed lack of 
competencies provide grounds for saying that a person is either not an X 
or not a good X…but further that some categorizations are usable in 
explicitly moral ways, so that the fulfilment of moral duties and 
commitments is basic for the assessment of the performance of 
category tasks and thus for a person’s being constituted as a good X, 
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which is itself central to the notion of being a genuine X, e.g., a good 
doctor…” (Jayyusi, 1984, p. 44, emphasis in original). 
The fundamentally moral nature of psychologists’ talk becomes evident in the 
following two extracts taken from interview number nine, with Cathy, and 
interview three, with Don. Both participants can be seen to orient to their 
professional status through invoking the duties of mental health professionals.  
3.1.2.1.  Orienting to professional moral identity 
Extract 3: KK/P9: Lines 663-665, p. 17 
663 Cathy:         … I think at- all mental  
664  health professionals have a role and a duty to  
665  think about what they’re doing. 
Extract 4: KK/P3: Lines 934-935, p. 24 
934 Don:   =Ehm (.) But also our job, (.) is to keep people 
935  alive (.), [and to] keep them well. (.) 
In the above examples, the participants can be seen to orient to their professional 
incumbency as mental health professionals who ought to keep people alive and 
well (Don’s excerpt) and should reflect on their practice (Cathy’s excerpt). 
Participants therefore display their awareness of a set of obligations bound with 
their professional identity as a ‘psychologist’ and consequently the moral 
judgements that may be invoked through the (lack of) fulfilment of those 
obligations. Within this research interview set up, participants might respond in a 
certain way to display their commitments towards their clients and their ability to 
reflect on their practice in order to work up their identity as (morally) adequate 
practitioners, particularly so if potentially morally disputable issues are evoked. 
3.1.2.2.  Orienting to personal moral identity 
In the following extract taken from interview number one, Robert is managing to 
orient directly to the issue that advocating unethical practices might have 
implications for personal identity. However, he is doing this in a way that places 
himself in contrast to his colleague whose practices allegedly are of dubious 
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moral standing.23 Such a move allows Robert to show that he knows what the 
issue is, without any of it being personally relevant to him; indeed he casts 
himself as a moral crusader on the issue.  
Extract 5: KK/P1: Lines 2659-2669, p. 66 
2659 Kat: Is it what they say?= 
2660 Robert: =Yeah     
2661 Kat: …or-- [Mmm    ] 
2662 Robert:       [Because], because, I’m a good person! 
2663 Kat: Mmm. 
2664 Robert: (.) Yeah? (.) If what you’re saying is true,  
2665 Kat: Mmm. 
2666 Robert: …if this is unethical, and I advocate something 
2667  that’s unethical= 
2668 Kat: =Mmm. 
2669 Robert: …then I must be a bad person. (.) 
The significance of the above formulation could well be transferred to this 
interview setting. Accordingly, it could be argued that if the psychologists 
participating in this interview advocate something that is being interactionally 
constructed as unethical, then consequently they would risk being seen as bad 
people. Note that the implications for participants’ moral identity are thus far more 
extensive: not only could they be perceived as morally inadequate psychologists, 
but they could also be seen as bad people. 
I argue that, in their attempts to rhetorically defend against the potential criticism 
of being morally inadequate psychologists and bad people, participants are 
caught up in a dilemma. On the one hand they want to acknowledge and 
demonstrate their awareness of potential ethical issues in their practice and thus 
portray themselves as reflective and concerned practitioners. On the other hand, 
however, this inherently creates trouble for them because their audience knows 
that they are part of such practices, and therefore they will have to start 
inoculating and providing justifications for these practices. In other words, 
                                            
23 See appendix twelve for the talk preceding this extract (lines 2634 to 2669). 	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participants will have to manage their stake and accountability (e.g., Potter, 1996) 
and the dilemma of how to appear morally adequate whilst talking about 
contested practices of which they are part. The framing of both professional and 
personal accountability in terms of a moral imperative sets the scene for the 
coming analysis.  
In the next section, I evidence a number of discursive moves that participants use 
to deal with talk concerning practices that are depicted as potentially problematic. 
I will argue that by offering justificatory accounts when talking about sensitive 
issues arising in talk, the participants simultaneously displayed their orientation to 
the problematic nature of such practices. These various rhetorical strategies 
provide a way of organising the analysis. However, it is difficult to keep them 
strictly separate because in practice they do not form distinct elements within the 
talk from which they originated, and therefore some of them might be present in 
other extracts that we examine. Moreover, the following discursive moves are 
picked out here for particular consideration, as they are recurrent across the 
corpus of material in this study. There are numerous other devices through which 
the participants’ narrative descriptions, accountability and moral identity work is 
made relevant interactionally, and to which I will pay attention, including, for 
example, stake inoculation or avowals of a mental state disposition. These will 
act to support the main structure of the argument. 
As the analysis develops, I will be referring to the relevant literature where 
possible. This literature has been a very useful guide in my analytic work and 
also inspired some of the terminology I am using here. Also, it is important to 
emphasise that I am not suggesting that these strategies are necessarily 
consciously or deliberately employed to serve a particular purpose. Rather, they 
are part of culturally available linguistic repertoires and everyday discursive, 
theoretical, and clinical practice whose origins and effects are rarely questioned 
(Boyle, 2011; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). 
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3.2.  STRATEGIES OF ACCOUNTABILITY MANAGEMENT  
or doing being morally adequate whilst talking about contested practices of 
which one is part 
The first conversational move depicted here is the ‘severe end’ rhetorical device. 
This strategy has been previously described in psychiatrists’ discourses in which 
decisions about administering electroconvulsive treatment (ECT) were justified 
(Stevens & Harper, 2007). 
3.2.1.  The ‘severe end’ rhetorical device 
The ‘severe end’ device focuses on the severity and seriousness of the condition 
to warrant the use of medication. The next extract is taken from interview number 
four with Liz, which illustrates an explicit orientation to the moral dilemma 
surrounding the use of medication. 
Extract 6: KK/P4: Lines 2050-2100, p. 51-52 
2050 Liz: I’m just thinking about one particular 
2051  young man I worked with who had a diagnosis of 
2052  bipolar disorder, 
2053 Kat: M-hm. 
2054 Liz: …and I, I saw him (.) through his manic phases, 
2055  and he really was (.) you know, just very, very, 
2056  very unwell, ver-  very aggressive, very out of 
2057  touch with reality, very confused, 
2058 Kat: M-hm. 
2059 Liz: …ehm, behaving in very bizarre ways, and I, I  
2060  could see for him, that, you know, the medication  
2061  he (.) could be given helped him, 
2062  (text omitted) 
2071 Liz: But it was also deeply painful to him that he had 
2072  to be on medication indefinitely, and he didn’t 
2073  want to take it, he didn’t like the side-effects,    
2074  [you know], and (.) and, and I am perfectly 
2075 Kat: [Mmm     ] 
2076 Liz: aware that the research is [often] extremely 
2077 Kat:                            [Mmm  ]       
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2078 Liz: selective, you know, what [gets published], 
2079 Kat:                           [M-hm          ]   
2080 Liz: and what gets funded, 
2081 Kat: Mmm= 
2082 Liz: =gives a very distorted [picture of] what’s 
2083 Kat:                         [M-hm      ] 
2084 Liz: (.) useful. 
2085 Kat: Mmm= 
2086 Liz: =…and, so, I,I can’t unreservedly say that [I’m] 
2087 Kat:                                            [Mmm] 
2088 Liz: (.) glad he takes his medication, I [feel] 
2089 Kat:                                     [Mmm ] 
2090 Liz: uncomfortable, [and I] feel= 
2091 Kat:                [Mmm  ]      =And yet, it sounds 
2092  like he still needs to take the medication= 
2093 Liz: =Well, you know, if he’s not gonna be (tearing) 
2094  around naked (.) attacking people, wh(h)ich i(h)s 
2095  wh(h)at h(h)e d(h)id, 
2096 Kat: Mmm. 
2097 Liz: …before he took it, then, yeah! 
2098 Kat: Mmm. 
2099 Liz: Yeah! Absolutely! But it’s, it’s, it’s a deep 
2100  moral problem, 
Liz’s first turn occurred in the context of discussion about the practices of 
diagnosing and medicating young people that are common in the adolescent 
inpatient unit where she works. She offers a particular example from her clinical 
practice, in which she accounts for the use of medication as a helpful way of 
managing the young person’s presentation. She does this by constructing this 
young man as having a “diagnosis of bipolar disorder”, who she “saw” through his 
“manic phases” and who was “very very, very, very unwell, ver- very aggressive, 
very out of touch with reality, very confused, behaving in very bizarre ways” (lines 
2051-2059). Liz uses a number of extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) 
to indicate the abnormality of this young man’s presentation. Note that the word 
“very” is used nine times in one sentence. Liz can also be seen to use the 
strategy of reification (Potter, 1996) to construct the abstract notion of bipolar 
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disorder as a witnessable set of anomalous symptoms and socially undesirable 
behaviours, thus evoking its significance as ‘real’ signs of mental disorder. 
Liz then moves back to the other side of the argument and displays empathy with 
the young man’s predicament (“it was deeply painful to him that he had to be on 
medication indefinitely, and he didn’t want to take it, he didn’t like the side-effects” 
(lines 2071-2073). She goes on to argue that she is “perfectly aware” (line 2074) 
of problems with research, which is given particular emphasis through her stress 
on the word “perfectly”, enabling Liz to display her awareness of the controversy 
surrounding the evidence of the benefits of medication. This, together with 
appeals to her personal discomfort of feeling “uncomfortable”, allows Liz to 
portray herself as a reflective, sensitive and concerned practitioner whilst at the 
same time enables her to justify the use of medication against the young person’s 
will. Note that avowals of a mental state disposition, in this case ‘uncomfortable 
feelings’, is an effective rhetorical strategy for establishing the veracity of the 
speaker’s account, particularly in situations where there is moral credibility at 
stake (Edwards & Potter, 2005).  
In lines 2091-2092 I can be seen to make what appears to be the contrast 
between Liz’s personal views and the reality of the practice she describes 
explicit, by saying that despite her concerns it seems that “he still needs to take 
the medication”. Such a comment is hearably challenging and latched onto by 
Liz’s “Well” followed by appropriate justification. ‘Well’ signals the classic 
conversation analytic ‘dispreference’ pattern, in which a response that is 
interactionally dispreferred, for instance declining an invitation, is preceded by 
‘well’ (Levinson, 1983). This is followed by “you know”, which appeals to 
intersubjectivity (Edwards, 2003) and implies that what is to follow is something 
knowable to both Liz and myself; that is: “if he’s not gonna be tearing around 
naked, attacking people, which is what he did”, then it logically follows that he will 
need to take the medication. Note that tearing around naked invokes 
inappropriate sexualised conduct in public, whilst the second example of 
attacking people invokes risk and dangerousness to others, further highlighting 
the abnormality of the behaviour and makes sectioning and forced drug treatment 
reasonable. In addition, Liz ‘s emphasis that these behaviours “did” (line 2095) 
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happen suggests that these are not just made up examples, thus helping to 
bolster the factuality of Liz’s account. 
Of interest is a continual dilemmatic movement in the speech between the 
narrative of medication being morally controversial and a narrative of medication 
being necessary to manage extreme behaviours and states of mind. Such a 
flexible account presents Liz as the kind of person who can see both sides and 
who can question her own practice. It thereby attends to the problem of how to 
appear sympathetic to her clients and morally adequate within the research 
interview while providing justification for contested practices of which Liz is part. 
The second example concerns justifying the use of medication with the same 
‘severe end’ rhetorical strategy, but this time to manage the conduct of the child 
diagnosed with ADHD. Just prior to this extract, Cathy and I started to debate 
ADHD diagnosis and the use of medication in children.  
Extract 7: KK/P9: Lines 2340-2346, p. 58 
2340 Cathy: …you have a child who’s very difficult to 
2341  parent”. And they [are]. They come in here, 
2342 Kat:                   [Mmm]                    M-hm. 
2343 Cathy: --  Ehm, I had a child who literally climbed that 
2344  bookcase and was hanging off the top, 
2345 Kat: Mmm= 
2346 Cathy: =…and tried to throw my phone out the window, 
The extract starts with Cathy’s account of what she would say to the parents of 
the child with a diagnosis of ADHD. Of interest is how Cathy constructs the child 
in this account: “you have a child who’s very difficult to parent” (line 2340). This 
construction is a noteworthy formulation in that it absolves parents’ blame, 
warrants medication and inherently locates the problem and responsibility or 
blame in the child. In lines 2343-2346 Cathy can be seen to mobilise the severe-
end rhetorical device. Cathy provides a vivid description of a child who “literally 
climbed that bookcase”, “was hanging off the top” in the consulting room and 
“tried to throw [her] phone out the window”. Such descriptions support the ‘literal’ 
observable factuality of evidence of this child’s undoubtedly unmanageable, risky 
and socially inappropriate behaviour. Hence the need for medication is warranted 
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to take the edge off the symptoms, as in fact claimed by Cathy herself in her talk 
prior to this extract in lines 2197-2199, p. 54: “…you could hypothesise, that if 
there is the medication that takes the edge off these symptoms, no matter where 
they’ve come from…”. On the whole, Cathy could be seen to present herself as 
sympathetic and understanding of the parents’ concerns, although the child’s 
position seems to be neglected in this account.  
To summarise the analysis of the two extracts above, the children’s presentations 
are constructed as so extreme, risky or totally uncontrollable that the treatment by 
medication is strongly warranted. The above accounts are also powerful in their 
effects of portraying the speakers as concerned but pragmatic. 
3.2.2.  Minimisation  
This section concerns the minimisation of the problem of diagnosing children. We 
start with the extract taken again from interview number nine with Cathy, which 
follows soon after Extract 1. Having previously asked Cathy what makes the 
problem in need of psychological input, she precedes this extract with her talk 
about how hard it is not to locate problems in children “and to not get fixated on 
diagnosis” (line 678). 
Extract 8: KK/P9: Lines 678-728, p. 17-18 
678 Cathy: …and to not get fixated on di--  Diagnosis is not 
679  a big thing in this team. 
680 Kat: Do you have to diagnose, then, or you don’t have 
681  to? 
682 Cathy: We have to do it on RIO, which is the electronic 
683  system= 
684 Kat: =Mmm. 
685 Cathy: Ehm, it’s a, it’s a Trust requirement,   
686 Kat: M-hm=       
687 Cathy: =…but we don’t necessarily do it with the 
688 Kat: M-hm     
689 Cathy: families, and quite often we’ll look for the 
690  lowest-level diagnosis to put on the system, 
691 Kat: Mmm. 
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692 Cathy: …and put it as a query.                         
693  (text omitted) 
719 Cathy: =And we’ve been promised that it’s not used for 
720  anything other than commissioning and looking to 
721  see (.) where it is, it’s not [something] that 
722 Kat:                               [Mmm      ]  
723 Cathy: follows the child around, 
724 Kat: Right. 
725 Cathy: …or that is, ehm, identifiable, 
726 Kat: Mmm= 
727 Cathy: =…on, on any other records. And it’s not 
728  something that we send to outside agencies. 
This extract starts by Cathy claiming that “diagnosis is not a big thing in [their] 
team” by which she can be seen to be orienting to the possible undesirability or 
unpopularity of diagnosing in her team, and thus marking her potential 
disagreement with diagnosing children. Such a statement also implies that her 
team might choose not to diagnose and consequently if they do so, then it is 
because they are required to. This understanding seems to be taken up by me in 
the next turn, in which I query whether or not they “have to diagnose” (lines 680-
681). Note that whilst this question provides some sympathetic and non-
accusatory features (“have to” invokes organisational requirements thus 
rendering Cathy not specifically accountable), at the same time it also presents 
potential trouble for Cathy: that she is doing something she seems to disagree 
with. In her response in line 685, Cathy in fact stresses that this is a “Trust 
requirement”, thus not only making it explicit that she is bound by these 
constraints but also staying on the safer side in terms of personal accountability 
(Hepburn, 2000). Appealing to the institutional demands has been one of the 
most frequently used discursive strategies to manage one’s stake, which will be 
described under the ‘redirecting the accountability’ strategy later. Moreover, in the 
discussion section I will be looking at how this rhetorical device reveals the 
broader institutional dilemmas in which these psychologists find themselves. 
Mitigating one’s moral culpability can also be done by means of footing, i.e., 
Cathy’s use of institutionalised “we” throughout this extract, which makes us 
aware that even if she was to be accountable for practicing diagnosing, she 
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would not be alone. Moreover, such a footing might signify her professional 
membership category of concerned yet institutionally loyal employee. 
To further manage her accountability, Cathy goes on to assert that they “don’t 
necessarily do it with the families” (line 687-689), which not only implies some 
kind of bureaucratic necessity of diagnosing rather than its actual clinical 
usefulness, but it also makes us aware that clients might be given a diagnosis 
without their awareness. Cathy further claims that they “often look for the lowest-
level diagnosis” (line 690), which indicates a common activity of assigning what 
sounds like the least detrimental or pathological marker possible, and 
consequently possibly a less harmful form of this activity. Finally, in line 692 she 
claims that they “put it as a query”, implying uncertainty and reservation with 
regards to applying specific diagnostic categories.  
In the remainder of this extract, Cathy can be seen to continuously orient to the 
diagnosing as a negative activity, whilst minimising her accountability in taking 
part in such an undesirable practice. In lines 719-728 Cathy invokes a “promise” 
given to her team that the diagnosis is “not used for anything other than 
commissioning”, “it’s not something that follows the child around or that is 
identifiable”, “and it’s not [sent] to outside agencies”. This list of concerns calls 
upon Cathy’s own special actions taken along with her colleagues to ensure that 
the diagnosis does not have a negative impact, which might have been otherwise 
inferred if Cathy did not offer her reassuring account. This suggests a careful 
acknowledgement of the ‘toxicity’ of diagnosis in terms of its impact on children’s 
lives and futures, including the fact that certain diagnoses stay with people 
forever. However, these potentially detrimental effects are at the same time 
minimised and rendered as already prevented. On the whole, such a discursive 
construction helps Cathy present herself as a sufficiently concerned practitioner 
who is actively trying to protect children from the negative impact of diagnosing 
thus also serving to work up an identity of a morally adequate psychologist who 
does not wish to pathologise children and their families. 
The following extract that comes from interview number eight with Mary is 
another example of the minimising rhetorical strategy.  
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Extract 9: KK/P8: Lines 556-567, p. 14 
556 Mary: …I would give them, ehm, (.) there’s, there’s 
557  certain codes on ICD-10 that we can put into the 
558  system, which count as a diagnosis, wh-  but are 
559  less, like, specific. So they might be things, 
560  like, 
561 Kat: Mmm. 
561 Mary: …ehm, (.) ((in a softer voice)) I can’t remember 
562  the exact terminology, ((resumes usual tone of 
563  voice)) [but like, relationship] difficulties 
564 Kat:         [M-hm, mm, mm          ]   
565 Mary: [within] the family or something 
566 Kat: [Mmm   ] 
567  So [I put that down], 
In lines 558 to 559 Mary goes on to suggest that she would put “less specific” 
codes, “which count as a diagnosis”. Hence, similar to Cathy and several other 
participants, Mary can be seen to downplay the problems associated with 
diagnosing, and by doing so, she implies that there is an issue with such a 
practice. Although in vague terms, Mary furthermore invokes the psychosocial 
(“relationship difficulties within family” in lines 563-565), rather than medical 
concepts, perhaps orienting to desirability of displaying her awareness of the 
importance of relational as opposed to biomedical explanations for children’s 
distress. On the whole, by employing a minimising strategy she inevitably 
engages in a moral accounting for her actions, and provides an image of good 
intentions, even though the organisational constraints may lead to a more 
problematic practice. 
In summary, the two examples above illustrate the employment of a minimising 
strategy that attends to the issue around diagnosing children while softening it by 
constructing it in a less problematic and safer manner.  
3.2.3.  Normalising techniques  
This section presents a collection of discursive moves that could be loosely 
encompassed under the umbrella of normalising techniques. The first strategy is 
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routinisation that, according to Locke and Edwards (2003, p. 245), is a robust 
rhetorical pattern, where the notion that one is specifically accountable for an 
action which requires a reason or account, is resisted by defining that action as 
everyday, ordinary or habitual. In this case, routinisation serves to downplay the 
debate about diagnosing children by suggesting that despite the apparent initial 
hesitation or possibly even reluctance, the need to diagnose eventually comes 
with more experience. 
3.2.3.1.  Routinisation 
              or the need to diagnose comes with more experience 
The next passage of talk occurred early in the interview with participant five, Val, 
and follows on from our conversation about the various presentations of children 
coming to her service. 
Extract 10: KK/P5: Lines 92-115, p. 3 
92 Val: …ehm, and they’ll be referred to us, so we can 
93  explore that in more detail. Ehm (.) And for 
94  somebody who is quite new to the service, eh (.) 
95  I think I started off being quite, ehm, (.) 
96  finding it hard to accept that these children may 
97  have autism or that it may be diagnosable, at 
98  such a young (.) [age], and, perhaps, wanting to 
99 Kat:                  [Mmm] 
100 Val: (.) deflect or ignore some of the symptoms, 
101 Kat: Mmm= 
102 Val: =…that I was seeing, because (.) it’s (.) it’s-    
103  it was quite (.) tempting to, kind of, say “Well, 
104  this child is just a little bit delayed, and 
105  maybe they’ll come to it later”. Sometimes     
106  [it’s quite] hard to see those, those things. 
107 Kat: [M-hm      ] 
108 Val: But, a,as I’ve become more experienced in the job 
109  and working, ehm, working with more children, 
110  seeing for myself different behaviours, and 
111  a,approaches from different children, 
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112 Kat: M-hm. 
113 Val: …it’s just become easier to see some very 
114  specific behaviours that might be (.) 
115  [attributable] to autism. 
Val works up her identity as someone who initially found it “hard to accept that 
children may have autism or that it may be diagnosable, at such a young age” 
(lines 95-98) and who “perhaps, want[ed] to deflect or ignore some of the 
symptoms” (lines 98-100). Note that the avowal of the person’s mental states, in 
this case Val’s “wanting”, can help in building up the factual plausibility of the 
person’s account (Edwards & Potter, 2005). Here, it perhaps helps Val work up 
her identity as someone who does not wish to pathologise children, thus securing 
her moral credentials.  
What is interesting then is what appears to be a shift from ethics to competence: 
the above narrative is followed by “But” in line 108 and the story that seems to 
start justifying the very same practices that Val previously found difficult, and 
which are now constructed as something that “just became[s] easier to see” (line 
113) with more practice. The phrase ‘I used to find it hard to diagnose, but as I’ve 
become more experienced..’ is reminiscent of Wooffitt ‘s (1992) ‘I used to be 
sceptical, but experience of the alien abduction has led me to think…’. This is a 
type of a stake inoculation (e.g., Potter, 1996) in which Val could have been 
avoiding criticism for pathologising children by diagnosing them at such an early 
age. As Edwards (1997) pointed out, the preceding scepticism is crucial, in that it: 
“sets up the recommendation as unprejudiced, based on experience, 
and indeed counter to prior expectations. The speaker is constructed 
as a common-sense reasoner who was initially sceptical, just like the 
listener, not disposed to thinking such things, but forced to do so by 
experiential evidence. That is, the speaker is interactionally sensitive to 
grounds for doubt and attributional issues of accountability both in the 
reported events and their reporting” (p. 73). 
Indeed, Val produces such experiential evidence by offering a first-hand account 
of how she was “working with more children” (line 109) and “different children” 
(line 111), implying a large proportion of children and thus making it sound more 
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reliable, and “seeing for [her]self different behaviours” (line 110) suggesting that 
Val had seen these behaviours with her own eyes thus building up the undeniably 
factual nature of her experience, which is consequently hard to deny. Although 
not the main focus in this analysis, here again, as largely throughout the dataset, 
the strategy of ‘reification’ is used (Potter, 1996) to conceptualise abstract 
concepts of mental disorders in children as concrete, material things, as 
something the children can ‘have’. Accordingly, it can be argued that the whole 
account acts in support of the diagnostic practices whilst allowing the speaker to 
present herself as a concerned, competent and morally adequate psychologist.  
3.2.3.2.  Renegotiating, re-categorising or re-defining  
This normalising strategy functions to re-define potentially contested practices as 
something less negative and less problematic (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). The 
next extract taken from the interview with Robert provides an example of this 
strategy. Here the issue at hand is (not)problematising children who find 
themselves in individual therapy.  
Extract 11: KK/P1: Lines 2024-2040, p. 50-51 
2024 Robert: Although I don’t (.) ((clicks fingers)) ehm (.) I 
2025  don’t problematise it. (.) [So I don’t] (.) I 
2026 Kat:                            [Mmm       ]  
2027 Robert: don’t (.) encounter them, I think, with the sense 
2028  that “You’ve got a problem, and I’m here to help 
2029  you with it”, 
2030 Kat: But you’re still seeing them, aren’t you? 
2031 Robert: ((a bit louder than usual)) Yeah. 
2032 Kat: Mmm= 
2033 Robert: =Well, usually, they like seeing me. 
2034 Kat: M-[hm      ] 
2035 Robert:   […because] (.) we have good fun, 
2036 Kat: M-hm=      
2037 Robert: =…because they get to choose stuff, [and because] 
2038 Kat:                                     [M-hm       ] 
2039 Robert: they’re probably not doing something else that 
2040  they would rather not do. 
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In lines 2028 to 2029, Robert talks about how he does not encounter children 
with the sense that “You’ve got a problem, and I’m here to help you with it.” 
Although Robert inserts “I think” in line 2027 which, according to Latour and 
Woolgar (1986), is considered to be a provisional and ambivalent statement, 
compared to the more factual statements such as ‘X is a fact’. The effect of the 
whole account nevertheless can be to display Robert’s reluctance to 
problematise or pathologise children, and thus to facilitate a portrayal of him as 
being a non-prejudicial, non-judgemental and moral psychologist. However, what 
this claim simultaneously does is expose an inherent contradiction: If Robert does 
not see children as having problems and his role as helping them, then why does 
he see children individually in his everyday practice? This dilemma is in fact 
taken up by me in my next question “But you’re still seeing them, aren’t you?” 
(line 2030), which can be hearably challenging due to the above reasons, and so 
might create potential trouble for Robert because it invites him to admit that what 
he says, or what he would like to do, contradicts what he does. In addition, “aren’t 
you?” is a form of a tag question that treats the recipient as already 
knowledgeable about the content of the statement (Edwards, 2003).  
Robert indeed displays his awareness of this by his agreement (“Yeah” in line 
2031) and deals with this challenge by saying that children “like seeing [him] 
because [they] have good fun, and they get to choose stuff” and because it is 
probably more convenient than “doing something else that they would rather not 
do” (lines 2033-2040). Robert therefore can be seen to respond to the trouble in 
my question by constructing and reframing his practice as something that is a 
positive activity for children, implying not only harmless consequences, but also 
fun and the opportunity to avoid something unwanted or dreary. Such a reframe 
might function to de-problematise this paradox, and package the activity of 
children being seen regularly for individual therapy even if the psychologist 
allegedly does not perceive them as a problem as far less problematic but indeed 
enjoyable.  
The next excerpt of talk, taken from interview six, was preceded by a debate 
about Zoe’s experience of how children understand being in therapy. Just prior to 
this extract, Zoe talked about how she explains the therapy set up and her role to 
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her young clients.  
Extract 12: KK/P6: Lines 1488-1585, p. 37-39 
1488 Zoe: you know, [not trying] to be a psychologist, 
1489 Kat:           [Mmm       ] 
1490 Zoe: almost. Just as if I’m somebody that’s, kind of, 
1491  meeting somebody new. 
1492 Kat: Mmm. 
1493 Zoe: …ehm, [because ] 
1494 Kat:       [And what] are their responses? [How do] 
1495 Zoe:                                       [Ehm   ] 
1496 Kat: they understand that?  
1497 Zoe: (.) How they understand what they’re here for?= 
1498 Kat: =Yeah, and that--  [Yeah] 
1499 Zoe:                    [Yeah]. I mean, th,the--  It 
1500  varies, because it [varies what]--  I mean, 
1501 Kat:                    [Mmm        ] 
1502 Zoe: a lot of children will come here and their 
1503  parents haven’t even told them where they’re 
1504  coming on the day. 
1505  (text omitted in which Zoe was describing how she 
1506  always starts with asking what the children want  
1507  to do to engage them) 
1576 Zoe: Most--  It is very much an age-related thing. I 
1577  find most of the younger children I work with, 
1578  they really like coming, and they sort of think 
1579  [“Oh    ] 
1580 Kat: [Younger] children? 
1581 Zoe: Yeah, [you know], “…it’s just my time to play, 
1582 Kat:       [Uh-huh  ] 
1583 Zoe: with <interviewee’s name>, [and to sort of do] 
1584 Kat:                            [Uh-huh, u,uh-huh ] 
1585 Zoe: stuff”. 
We enter at the point in which Zoe explains that she is “not trying to be a 
psychologist almost” (line 1488) and thus can be seen to work up a more generic, 
ordinary and informal membership category, namely “somebody that’s meeting 
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somebody new” (line 1490-1491). By casting both herself and a child as 
“somebody”, Zoe evokes a more symmetrical power relationship between the 
psychologist and the child in therapy, which works as a normalising 
conversational move in accounting for the potentially problematic practice 
(Hepburn, 2000); in this case, children possibly not consenting to therapy and not 
knowing why they are seeing a psychologist. It also appears that the 
‘psychologist’ identity is potentially problematic in this account and that de-roling 
seems to be a way out. 
Zoe can therefore be seen to be producing a ‘backstage’ talk of what Sacks 
(1992) described as a device of ‘cover identities’ or ‘doing being ordinary’. This 
device has been subsequently depicted in several DP studies (Antaki & Rapley, 
1996; McHoul & Rapley, 2002; Rapley 2004) that have analysed the naturally 
occurring talk from therapeutic encounters between therapists and their patients. 
This research has demonstrated how the rhetorical strategy of ‘cover identity’ is 
employed to ‘cover’ ‘PSYCHOLOGIST + CLIENT/PATIENT identities in 
preference to ‘NOT-PSYCHOLOGIST + NOT-CLIENT/PATIENT’ and ‘FRIEND + 
FRIEND’ identities. This research suggests that one of the functions of such a 
device is to promote engagement by concealing the official business agenda in 
meeting the mental health practitioner, which is to undertake a formal 
assessment to ascertain evidence for mental disorder, for which a person would 
need ‘expert’ treatment.  
This discursive strategy might have an important function not only in the actual 
therapeutic encounter that Zoe describes, but also within the interaction in this 
research interview. Here it seems to help Zoe display herself as a friendly 
clinician who tries to make the therapeutic encounter a less threatening and more 
positive experience for children, and therefore effectively avoiding the conclusion 
that could otherwise be inferred about the reported situation being a scary and 
distressing experience for children, given that they attend therapy without their 
awareness and thus consent, and therefore raising the issue of ethics.  
Furthermore, similar to the extract above, the children’s unawareness of why they 
are in therapy gets reworked as a positive experience for them: “they really like 
coming” (line 1578), and they think: “Oh, it’s just my time to play” (line 1581). The 
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insertion of the word “just” could serve to further downplay the problematic nature 
of this situation. Note that the children’s positive experience of being in therapy is 
presented as an allegedly first-hand account and thus given particular emphasis 
through the use of a powerful device of direct reported speech (Woofitt, 2005) in 
lines 1581 to 1585. 
What is also striking is the systematic vagueness throughout the extract, e.g., 
“I’m somebody that’s, kind of, meeting somebody new” (lines 1490-1491), “It 
varies, because it varies what-- I mean” (lines 1499-1500) or “to sort of do staff” 
(line 1583-1585), which might further help minimise the significance of what is 
being described. Edwards and Potter (1992) suggest that such vague 
formulations are difficult to challenge because although some account was 
offered, the details do not need to be necessarily delineated thus protecting Zoe 
from potential criticism if something inappropriate was to be said. 
To summarise, in the section above we have seen how psychologists worked to 
reframe a potentially contested issue of children being in therapy without their 
consent and when they are not seen as a problem. This allows psychologists to 
manage the moral predicament they are caught in, and to construct their actions 
as well as reports of their actions as less problematic. Moreover, these 
respecifications can work as ‘normalising techniques’, thus, in line with Billig’s 
(1992) findings, they can work to ‘settle’ potential troubles. This also seems to 
reveal something about the institution and its traditional ways of practicing in the 
form of individual therapy with children, which might consequently pose dilemmas 
for the psychologists who might disagree with such practices. 
3.2.4.  Doing being democratic 
or liberal arguments for illiberal ends (Augoustinos & Every, 2007) 
This section focuses on another discursive move, ‘doing being democratic’, which 
has been documented in a political and racist discourse by a number of authors, 
including Tileaga (2010), Augoustinos and Every (2007), and Wetherell and 
Potter (1992). This strategy will be demonstrated separately to the one that 
follows it (Maxims of practical politics), although it is recognised that they are 
closely related and work to achieve the same ends in interaction. That is, they 
both invoke liberal arguments in situations that usually involve illiberal ends, and 
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thus serve to build up the moral adequacy of psychologists in talk around a 
variety of sensitive topics.  
According to Wetherell and Potter (1992), language does not need to be overtly 
discriminatory in order to generate oppressive effects. Based on their study of 
racist talk, they go on to argue that discursive practices that in fact eliminate 
explicit signs of discrimination in favour of liberal arguments of individual rights, 
choice and freedom have considerably more rhetorical power in justifying 
discriminatory practices and the current state of affairs. In the next two extracts, I 
illustrate the deployment and effects of typical liberal democratic principles of 
freedom and choice in psychologists’ talk about contested issues in their work 
with children. 
Here the conversation is about diagnosing children. We join the conversation at 
the point when Joan produces a reported speech of what she would say in her 
practice to a parent.  
Extract 13: KK/P7: Lines 1892-1914, p. 47 
1892 Joan: …you know, we always (.) are very clear, “It’s 
1893  your choice, whether you think that’s something 
1894  you would like your child (.) to have 
1895  [as a label, if you think     ]               
1896 Kat: [Oh, I see. so they don’t have] to be [labelled] 
1897 Joan:                                       [No      ] 
1898 Kat: if they [don’t want] to. Because different 
1899 Joan:         [No        ] 
1900 Kat: services (.) do need to (.) [diagnose]. [So] in 
1901 Joan:                             [No      ]  [No]   
1902 Kat: here you don’t have to? 
1903 Joan: Well, we have to (.)-  [i,it]--  There’s a (.) 
1904 Kat:                        [Yeah] 
1905 Joan: a,an anomaly, in that something has to be put 
1906  down for the commissioners on the computer, (.)   
1907  [about-       ] 
1908 Kat: [For everyone?] 
1909 Joan: For everybody, something that-   
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1910  but [there are] various psychological categories  
1911  that you can use, and 
1912 Kat: Mmm. 
1913 Joan: …and X axis categories, where you can say 
1914  ‘context-related difficulties’,  
In lines 1892 to 1895, Joan begins her account with constructing the process of 
diagnosing as something that is the parents’ “choice” whether they “would like 
[their] child to have as a label, if [they] think”, which is something that the 
professionals are “always” “very clear” about, thus providing an image of 
democratic environment, even though, as it later becomes clear, the institutional 
requirements may paint a rather different picture. Note the use of the extreme 
case formulation “always” to establish the perennial character of what Joan and 
her colleagues would say in a particular situation.  
Joan’s democratic construction of the process of diagnosing as something that 
parents can decide themselves implies that not every parent might want a 
diagnosis for their child, and so, accordingly, one would expect that the diagnosis 
would then not be given. This formulation is met with my somewhat surprised 
reaction and questioning whether their service does not need to diagnose (lines 
1896-1902) given the increased pressure on services to diagnose. With an initial 
series of “No” statements across lines 1897 to 1901 that appear to cement the 
idea of choice and deny anything other than democratic conclusions, Joan later 
produces a statement of “well we have to” (line 1903), which then creates a 
paradox and a potential difficulty for Joan, since it seems to undermine her initial 
formulation that diagnosing is the parents’ choice rather than the necessary 
requirement of the psychologist’s job to give a diagnosis, as it turns out, to 
“everybody” (line 1909).  
As a way of dealing with this situation, Joan can be seen to draw on the same 
strategy used by the other participants previously, that is, minimisation, with the 
effect to downplay the problem with compulsory diagnosing by regarding it as a 
mere administrative task done “for the commissioners on the computer” (line 
1906). This suggests that the parents’ choice in the therapy room would not be 
affected and the notion of democracy can be resumed.  
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3.2.5.  Maxims of practical politics (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) 
Drawing on Wetherell and Potter’s (1992) analysis of political discourse about 
race and Billig’s (1992) concern with common sense and political legitimacy in his 
analysis of talk about the royal family, I will look at the ‘maxims of practical 
politics’, also referred to as ‘rhetorical commonplaces’ (Billig, 1996), which 
function as self-sufficient arguments that require little elaboration or explanation 
due to their taken-for-granted quality. Wetherell and Potter (1992) identified ten 
such commonplace arguments24 that were typically deployed in political 
discourse, such as ‘you have to be practical’, which on their own seem 
reasonable enough, but in a particular context might provide a warrant for the 
adoption of discriminatory policies.  
This section focuses on two maxims - ‘Nobody should be compelled’ and ‘You 
have to be practical’ - in accounting for two controversial areas of clinical 
practice: the issue of children (not)consenting to therapy and the question of 
(not)dealing with families’ social problems. 
3.2.5.1.  Nobody should be compelled 
              or I’ve never tried to shut anybody in my room… 
In the following extract taken from interview number two, I can be seen to initiate 
a topic of what I assume to be an inherent power imbalance in the therapeutic 
relationship between Fran and children. This is followed by my question “How do 
you work with that?” (line 1017), which works to present me as an open-minded 
interviewer (T. Rapley, 2001) who aims to facilitate the interviewee’s account 
about this sensitive topic.  
Extract 14: KK/P2: Lines 1013-1039, p. 26 
1013 Kat: Mm, mm, mmm. Okay. Right. I mean, there clearly 
1014  is a (.) power difference, between you and, eh, 
1015  and children [that you’re] working with. Eh, 
1016 Fran:              [M-hm       ] 
1017 Kat: how do you work with that? 
1018 Fran: I think there’s a power difference in every 
                                            
24 See appendix thirteen for Wetherell and Potter’s (1992) Maxims of practical politics. 
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1019  relationship. 
1020 Kat: M-[hm ] 
1021 Fran:   [Ehm], and because I think that, I guess I’m 
1022  always aware that there’s a power difference. I 
1023  mean, with children, there’s an obvious one. You 
1024  [know]. It’s made worse, by the fact that they 
1025 Kat: [Mmm ] 
1026 Fran: probably ((in a softer voice)) haven’t chosen to 
1027  come here. So I do spend time on – as I said at 
1028  the beginning – why they’ve come, 
1029 Kat: M-hm. 
1030 Fran: …eh, whether they want to be seen. Ehm, I always 
1031  say that the door’s open, I’ve never (.) tried to 
1032  shut anybody in my room, I know that different, 
1033  (.) ehm, disciplines do different things around 
1034  that, but I 
1035 Kat: Mmm= 
1036 Fran: =…don’t believe anybody should be made to stay, 
1037 Kat: Mmm= 
1038 Fran: =…don’t believe that anybody should have to have 
1039  mental health intervention. 
Fran initially responds by stating that “there’s a power difference in every 
relationship” (line 1018-1019), which has the effect of normalising the power 
relations. She then, however, goes on to repair this formulation by showing her 
awareness of, and concern about, this potentially being an issue, and by stating 
in lines 1022 to 1023 that she is “always aware that there’s a power difference” 
which is more “obvious” with children because they “probably haven’t chosen to 
come”. To frame something as potentially compulsory is rhetorically undesirable 
from the current societal liberal discourse of freedom and human rights 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992), and although such a statement works to display Fran 
as a good, reflective psychologist, it also requires her to subsequently justify the 
potential moral accountability related to seeing children who might not want to be 
seen. To manage this, Fran can be seen to be ‘doing being democratic’ by saying 
that she spends time asking children “whether they want to be seen” (line 1030), 
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implying that children have a say in decision-making around receiving 
psychological input.  
Of particular interest is the subsequent justificatory account that formulates what 
can be recognised as a classic version of the maxim of ‘nobody should be 
compelled', specifically that: “the door’s open”; “I’ve never tried to shut anybody in 
my room”; “I don’t believe anybody should be made to stay”, “I don’t believe that 
anybody should have to have mental health intervention” (lines 1031-1039). 
Fran’s account is made plausible further through a mental disposition avowal “I 
don’t believe” that signals her personal moral reasoning behind her actions, and 
through using the extreme expressions “always” or “never” (Pomerantz, 1986). All 
of these devices assist in cementing Fran’s identity as a concerned, well-meaning 
practitioner who despite the circumstances is able to practice in morally adequate 
ways.  
Another interesting feature of Fran’s talk is her statement in lines 1032 to 1034 “I 
know that different disciplines do different things around that, but I…”, which is a 
rhetorical device that has been described by Augustinos and Evere (2007) who 
termed it ‘positive self and negative other presentation’ (p. 129). These authors 
argued that this strategy is commonly applied in elite and particularly political 
speeches because of its usefulness in bringing off a criticism and re-directing 
accountability to others by presenting self in a positive light, whilst the other in a 
negative light.  
3.2.5.2. You have to be practical 
            or you have to accept the limitations of what you as a psychologist can do 
Cathy’s turn occurred in the context of our discussion about the wider social 
issues that impact on the families.  
Extract 15: KK/P9: Lines 2475-2495, p. 61 
2475 Cathy:                  …  And there are limitations, 
2476  on what work you can do, when there’s all this 
2477  wider, 
2478 Kat: Mmm. 
2479 Cathy: …stuff going on. [So if] somebody lives in a 
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2480 Kat:                  [Mmm  ]  
2481 Cathy: council flat, and their door’s being broken down, 
2482  (text omitted) 
2491 Cathy: …you know. ((resumes usual tone of voice)) At--    
2492  When you’ve got all of this going on, 
2493 Kat: Mmm. 
2494 Cathy: …(.) i,it-  y,you have to accept the limitations 
2495  of what you as a psychologist can do, 
In this extract, Cathy directly orients to the social problems that people who come 
to consult her face in their lives, and thus displays herself as a reflective and 
concerned practitioner. However, at the same time she reiterates twice (lines 
2475-2476 and lines 2494-2495) that, as psychologists, we have to accept the 
limitations of what we can do. Such a pragmatic realism appreciates and 
emphasises the practical constraint on action and invokes the commonsensical 
causal explanation that not only takes for granted the assumption of what 
psychologists working in CAMHS do (and crucially what they do not do), but it 
also seems to close down any potential enquiry that this state of affairs is open to 
question or change. The power of such a statement is in its very explicitness of 
the reasonableness of a psychologist not dealing with people’s troubling 
environments and the wider social contexts. Employing the maxim of practical 
politics therefore is an incredibly effective strategy in that the reasonableness of 
such statements appears to justify both moral and clinical accountability for not 
taking actions. Thus again, the production of idiomatic formulations trades on 
their robust and hard-to-deny properties. 
3.2.6.  Redirecting the accountability  
This discursive strategy serves to redirect accountability to another group of 
people or the institution, and to carefully distance oneself from any potential 
moral implications (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In the next extract, Zoe’s first turn 
occurs in the context of discussion about the use of diagnostic language. 
Extract 16: KK/P6: Lines 990-1105, p. 25-28 
990 Zoe: we (.)--  I suppose, ((breaths out)) the reason 
991  we look at normal and not normal – we don’t do it 
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992  much, probably the families do it [much more] – 
993 Kat:                                   [Mmm      ] 
994  is because they’re coming because they’re not 
995 Zoe: coping. You know, they’re coming into services 
996  because they don’t feel things are as they should 
997  be. They feel that things aren’t normal. 
998  (text omitted) 
1199 Zoe: …they’re saying “I think it might be this”, or 
1100  they don’t know, and they’re looking (.)     
1101  [often, to] have a diagnosis in order to (.) feel 
1102 Kat: [Mmm      ] 
1103 Zoe: relieved, that, actually, (.) ehm, you know, 
1104  ((laughing)) it w(h)asn’t somet(h)hing t(h)hey 
1105  w(h)ere d(h)oing. 
Although Zoe starts by acknowledging that part of the psychologist’s practice is to 
judge what does and does not count as “normal” (line 991), she nevertheless 
promptly abandons and changes this formulation by saying that “we don’t” do it 
much, probably the families do it “much more” (lines 991-992), which appears to 
construct a negative contrast between professionals and people who see them. 
Zoe then goes on to build this contrast further by stating in line 1101 that it is 
parents who “often” (quantifier implying frequency) look for a diagnosis. As such, 
Zoe can be seen to indirectly assign most of the responsibility for diagnosing to 
the parents rather than the professionals. Zoe also constructs the parents as 
feeling “relieved” in line 1103, which further boosts her interpretation that it is 
parents rather than mental health professionals who would initiate a diagnostic 
process, given the implicit notion of how motivated they are to obtain the 
diagnosis in order to exculpate themselves from a blameworthy role. 
The second example offered likewise concerns conversation around the use of 
diagnostic language. It starts with my enquiry about Cathy’s views on the 
helpfulness of giving a diagnosis of depression in a particular example that she 
offered in her prior talk. 
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Extract 17: KK/P9: Lines 855-863, p. 22 
855 Kat: In this case, would it help, to give a diagnosis 
856  of depression, you think? 
857 Cathy: It depends. Some--  I mean, some (.) some 
858  teenages-  teenagers come 
859 Kat: Mmm. 
860 Cathy: …and they tell me “I’m (.) totally depr(h)essed”. 
861  [They al]ready use (.) 
862 Kat: [M-hm   ]                 
863 Cathy: [they already use the language] ((laughs)) 
Following my question in lines 855 to 856, through which I endeavour to present 
myself as a ‘neutral’ questioner (T. Rapley, 2001) and I can be seen to invoke my 
identity of an active interviewer who elaborates on Cathy’s previous account and 
invites her to express her opinion on the helpfulness of giving a diagnosis in a 
particular case that she discussed just prior to this extract. Cathy first replies “it 
depends” (line 857), which is a flexible resource in that it can be used as a 
response to any challenging question leaving both possibilities open: it 
acknowledges that sometimes it might or it might not be helpful to give a 
diagnosis of depression, thus offering protection from potential criticism if a more 
specific claim was offered.  
In her subsequent account, Cathy further appears to avoid a more detailed 
response. Rather, in lines 857 to 860, she goes on to invoke “some teenagers”, 
her clients, who “already use the language” and tell [her] that “[they are](.) totally 
depr(h)essed”. Note that this account is given particular emphasis through the 
use of direct reported speech and emphasised words. Holt (1996) has proposed 
that direct reported speech frequently serves to dramatise accounts and to 
construct them as more vivid and plausible, and is regularly employed when it is 
important to produce evidence of what someone else said. On this occasion it 
could be argued that the device functions to accentuate Cathy’s construction of 
some of her ‘clients’ being those who initiate the use of medical terminology, 
rather than her. This enables her to situate the potential problem largely with 
them, and consequently further minimise her accountability and cement the 
membership category of a good psychologist. Hence, the ability to construct 
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something as coming from ‘clients’ is useful when issues of accountability arise. 
3.2.6.1.  Invoking of institutional demands 
             or we diagnose because we have to 
One particular type of redirecting the accountability is the invocation of the 
institutional context. A similar rhetorical device has been detailed by Hepburn 
(2000) in her study examining the way teachers deal with an implied accusation 
that they were bullying pupils. She demonstrated how an appeal to the 
institutional demands of the job and invoking the ‘general setup of the school’ 
offered a justification for teacher bullying and enabled teachers to distance 
themselves from being held accountable for reported intimidation. Such a 
strategy has been less explicitly employed and already described in some of the 
extracts above, in which the participants used the institutionalised ‘we’ as footing 
that provided them with a less self-threatening position on occasions that might 
have been problematic to personal or professional identity. In the following final 
extract, I will offer one more illustration of a direct invoking of the institutional 
requirement. 
Extract 18: KK/P6: Lines 102-167, p. 3-5 
102 Kat: M-hm. What do you mean – if I can [interrupt] you 
103 Zoe:                                   [Yeah     ] 
104  Yeah= 
105 Kat: =…by these, by these things, like, eh, obsessive- 
106  compulsive disorder, or the one you mentioned 
107  before-  it was attachment 
108 Zoe: Yeah. 
109 Kat: … child disorder. 
110 Zoe: Yeah. What [do I mean?] 
111 Kat:            [Yeah      ]. What do you mean by 
112  ((Zoe laughing)) those things? 
113 Zoe: Yeah. Well, we (.) have to (.) [diagnose] people 
114 Kat:                                [Mmm     ]  
115  now, [here], which is a new thing. 
116 Kat:      [Mmm ]                        Okay. 
117 Zoe: Well, it’s not new, obviously, kind of, in the 
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118  health service, [but it’s] new (.) in terms of it 
119 Kat:                 [M-hm    ] 
120 Zoe: being a mandatory requirement. [So we all] have 
121 Kat:                                [M-hm     ] 
122  to work within a, sort of, new constraint, 
123  (text omitted) 
161 Zoe:                        … Not everybody in 
162  this t(h)eam, [ag(h)rees wit(h)h] th(h)at. 
163 Kat:               [Yeah             ] 
164 Zoe: Not everybody [in this] team thinks that’s always 
165 Kat:               [Yeah   ]    
166 Zoe: helpful, but that’s what our Trust says that we 
167  have to do. 
In this extract, I could be seen to work up my identity of someone who, perhaps 
rather uncharacteristically for a third year clinical psychology trainee and thus 
perhaps somewhat confusingly for Zoe, appears to be enquiring about what the 
diagnostic terms mean (lines 102-112). Accordingly, I could be seen to build my 
category membership of ‘NOT PSYCHOLOGIST’ who claims not knowing, if only 
for the local research purposes. Of particular interest, however, is Zoe’s response 
to such an ethnomethologically25 (Garfinkel, 1967) informed, deliberately agnostic 
and consequently non-neutral and interventionist questioning. That is, rather than 
explicating what the diagnostic categories mean, Zoe can be seen to offer 
justification of why she has to diagnose children and thus manages to directly 
orient to potential yet unspoken criticism of diagnostic practice. She makes me 
aware that they “have to diagnose people now” (lines 113-115) and that this is a 
“mandatory requirement” (line 120), implying that if diagnosing is being 
interactionally constructed as a bad practice then Zoe would not be responsible 
for doing it, since she is required to follow the rules set for her. Such a 
conversational move appears to play an important role in distancing her from 
individual accountability and functions to justify Zoe’s practice by emphasising the 
existing constraint to her practice and the lack of choice in her decisions, and 
                                            
25 Garfinkel was famous for his ‘breaching experiments’, which are forms of empirical inquiry in 
which ordinary social interactions and unstated social roles are violated in order to reveal the 
processes that are at work in constructing the reality as ‘normal’. Garfinkel (1967) argued that one 
must breach expectancies in radical ways to see how the system works.  
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thus ultimately serving to work up her identity as a competent and morally 
adequate psychologist. 
In lines 161 to 167, Zoe then goes on to claim that “not everybody in [her] team 
agrees with that” and “thinks that’s always helpful”, and as such, she can be seen 
to express her potential disagreement with diagnostic practice, continuously 
orienting to it as something negative and sometimes unhelpful. This 
acknowledgement of undesirability of such a practice, however, is done carefully 
and in a less direct manner through the footing of an ‘animator’ (Goffman, 1981) 
who reports the views of her team rather than Zoe’s own. 
In summary, appealing to an external situation can be seen as being about 
handling the stake: the actions follow from wider contextual constraints ‘out there’ 
that are not in the speaker’s control. This presents diagnosing as simply a 
sensible response to the ‘ways things are’, rather than something that can be 
questioned or changed.  
It is important to re-iterate here that I am not arguing that the participants are 
intentionally or consciously doing the things described above. What I am 
suggesting is that from the discursive psychological perspective it is possible to 
analytically read the text in a way that reveals what effects the talk might have.  
 
CHAPTER FOUR - DISCUSSION 
This chapter has several objectives. First, I would like to revisit the aim of the 
study and provide a summary of the main analytic patterns and related 
conclusions. The results will then be situated in the wider macro context and 
compared to other studies. The next section will identify the research and clinical 
implications of the study, followed by a critical review of this research. The 
chapter concludes with a reflexive review. 
 
4.1.  SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
This study aimed to explore how clinical psychologists construct their work with 
77 
 
children, with a particular analytical focus on participants’ orientations towards, 
and justifications for, the challengeable status of the various practices that they 
described in their talk. The analysis began with contextualising the talk by looking 
at participants’ orienting to the interview requirements. Attention was then paid to 
the exploration of participants’ orientation to their professional and personal moral 
identity within the research interaction. The main part of the analysis examined 
the strategies of accountability management, focusing on sequences of talk 
where participants oriented to particularly sensitive areas within the talk-in-
interaction. 
The analysis evidenced a number of discursive manoeuvres employed by 
participants to manage their accountability in talking about practices depicted as 
potentially problematic. These included: (1) the ‘severe end’ rhetorical device that 
functioned to warrant the use of medication; (2) the minimisation strategy that 
was used to construct diagnosis in a minimal or safer manner; (3) normalisation 
techniques that comprised routinisation, which served to downplay problems with 
diagnosis by claims to competence; and renegotiating, re-categorising or re-
defining contested practices as less problematic or indeed as positive; (4) doing 
being democratic that constructed troubling practice as democratic; (5) employing 
’maxims of practical politics’ that seemed to legitimise contested practices by 
invoking liberal arguments (‘Nobody should be compelled’) or by emphasising the 
practical limitations on the work of psychologists (‘You have to be practical’); and 
finally (6) the discursive move of redirecting accountability or potential blame to 
service users and the institution, enabling participants to distance themselves 
from being held accountable for problematic practices.  
The discursive analysis of the extended accounts demonstrated that a pervasive 
feature of all the interviews was participants’ attentiveness to building up the 
moral nature of their practice and consequently their personal and professional 
identity. As a result, what may sensibly be inferred from this observation is that 
the research interview was a setting in which participants’ moral credibility was 
under scrutiny. Whilst DP is suitable for analysing the social actions performed in 
talk, it is not concerned with attempting to explain why. However, it is possible to 
make some suggestions to account for this finding and to begin to situate the 
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results of the analysis in a wider body of literature. 
First, it was suggested that the research context in which participants were 
interviewed in their category membership of a ‘psychologist’ is bound up with a 
moral assessment of the performance of their duties, which requires them to 
present themselves in a morally adequate light (e.g., Baruch, 1981; Jayyusi, 
1984). In addition, it could be suggested that because the controversies in clinical 
practice, such as children not consenting to therapy, were made relevant in the 
research interviews, the moral credentials of the psychologists interviewed were 
called into question by virtue of these subjects being discussed.  
Second, it is possible that the mere fact of asking psychologists to describe their 
practices is reason enough to invite questions about legitimacy and to place 
doubt on their moral credentials, as sometimes the most radical thing can be to 
ask a really mundane question, such as “How do you work with children and 
why?” Indeed, it is possible that any interview with professionals about their work 
is likely to invite questions about legitimacy. 
Third, participants were aware that I was a trainee on the UEL clinical psychology 
programme. As clinical psychologists in London teach and supervise trainees 
from this programme and many have also been trainees on the programme, they 
are often aware that it includes some teaching that is critical of psychiatric 
diagnosis and other practices of the psy-complex. Also, the title of my thesis on 
the information sheet stated “constructions of psychologists’ work” implying my 
social constructionist background, which is known to be associated with a stance 
that questions knowledge and dominant practices. Therefore, this might have 
posed a threat to participants in that it might require them to account for their 
practices.  
However, it could equally be proposed that there is something very particular 
about mental health practices with children and conceptualising children’s 
difficulties as mental disorders that require psychologists to morally exculpate 
themselves. Support for this suggestion was outlined in the introduction chapter 
where the literature demonstrated serious scientific and moral issues associated 
with the notion of mental illness, and consequently with practices that endorse 
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the biomedical paradigm. It was suggested that mental illness does not have a 
basis as a scientific construct leading to the conclusion that the process of 
diagnosing children with a mental disorder is a moral judgment on socially 
unsanctioned behaviour (Boyle, 1990; Sarbin & Mancuso, 1970, 1980; Szasz, 
1974) and a more palatable way to deal with complex moral, social and political 
issues impacting on children’s difficulties, which results in pathologising practices 
(Rapley et al., 2011). Accordingly, if these practices are questionable from a 
moral standpoint, then the psychologists interviewed for this research were faced 
with the rather urgent task of having to legitimise their practice and manage their 
moral credibility in the context of being interviewed by a trainee clinical 
psychologist who is aware that they are part of such practices. 
Considering the findings in the light of the critical literature and Sacks’s (1992) 
notion of ‘order at all points’ (see methodology chapter, section 2.6.), I argue that 
clinical psychology, whilst framing itself as a science, is fundamentally a moral 
enterprise, particularly when you are dealing with children whose distress and 
socially unsanctioned behaviour is being conceptualised and treated as mental 
illness. From this perspective, individual clinical psychologists are caught in a real 
predicament, a moral quagmire, suggesting that perhaps clinical psychology 
practice with children entails a constant grappling with moral issues.  
 
4.2.  SITUATING FINDINGS WITHIN THE WIDER DISCOURSES 
There is an argument that attention to what seems to be merely micro-instances 
of talk will detract from important broader ideological and political matters (Potter 
& Hepburn, 2012). However, an alternative argument proposed argues that it is 
possible to dissolve the dichotomy between the ‘macro’ oriented discourse 
analysis and this more detailed discursive analysis (see Hepburn, 2003; Rapley, 
2004, 2005; Wetherell, 1998; Widdicombe & Woffitt, 1995; Wooffitt, 2005). So 
how do the micro-interactions described in the analysis relate to the broader 
socio-political and institutional context? There are two ways in which this could be 
considered: the effects of macro on micro and vice versa. 
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4.2.1.  The effects of macro on micro 
Given that a number of participants drew on the ‘invoking of institutional 
demands’ device suggests something about the wider organisational structures in 
which individual psychologists work. For example, whilst participants oriented to 
the problems with some of their practices, they were clear that these stemmed 
from the institutional structures, legislative frameworks and policy provisions that 
regulate their practice. In their accounting work, participants often presented their 
personal beliefs, values and preferences in contrast with institutional agendas 
which were frequently presented as rigid. Although rhetorically this enabled them 
to manage their accountability and portray themselves as being competent and 
morally adequate psychologists, it also made us aware that individuals might not 
have much power to change the institutional realities determining their practice. 
This also allows for some tentative remarks to be made about policing what 
psychologists do. From the Foucauldian perspective (e.g., Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1982), it can be argued that psychologists and their clients are interconnected in 
a disciplinary space where both parties are operating under the powerful gaze: 
psychologists are actively looking over the children and families whilst they 
themselves are being overlooked by their employers, and ultimately the 
government bodies, such as the DOH. These macro conditions in which these 
psychologists practise thus provide a particular reality that poses a variety of 
dilemmas for them. For example, while it requires them to submit necessary 
information (e.g., give a diagnosis) to the commissioners to secure service 
funding and, as employees, ultimately their salaries, it also requires them to 
practise in ways that they might not choose. Therefore, an alternative formulation 
of the findings could be that the discursive moves that these psychologists have 
drawn on are attempted solutions to an institutional problem. 
The analysis presented here also demonstrates how participants drew on the 
mainstay principles of Western liberal democracies and neo-liberal philosophies, 
such as ‘choice’ and ‘freedom’ that are incorporated in governmental policies. 
The analytic patterns also showed how people’s desires are shaped by 
contemporary notions of mental health, and how both children and parents may 
feel they have problems and seek help. Furthermore, the findings suggest that 
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psychologists’ ways of accounting reflect the common cultural understanding 
noted by Harper (2013a):  
Many people in distress and their relatives seem to feel that without 
diagnosis, they will, in some way, be ‘blamed’ or seen as morally 
responsible for their distress. That a moral discourse is so culturally 
available as an alternative to a discourse of psychiatric diagnosis hints 
at its powerful social functions (p. 80; see also Coulter & Rapley, 
2011).  
Harper (2013a) goes on to suggest that, if we are to move away from a 
diagnostic discourse, we need to consider how we address these social 
functions. Later in this chapter I will consider this further. 
4.2.2.  The effects of micro on macro 
Drawing on works of Wetherell and Potter (1988, 1992) and Hepburn (2000, 
2001) (see also Rapley, 2004, 2005), it could be argued that a micro level 
analysis of talk, which focuses on people’s discursive patterning, can reveal how 
language is used to preserve existing dominant institutional structures. The 
above analysis suggests that psychologists’ accounts could work to ‘settle’ the 
current state of affairs (Billig, 1992). The participants presented themselves as 
concerned, reflective, friendly and democratic psychologists. Yet, on the macro 
level, these positive attributes can potentially be usable for more politically 
problematic tasks (Wetherell & Potter, 1988; 1992). These authors argued (see 
also Hepburn, 2003, p. 185-190) that the debates can be stopped by reasonably 
sounding liberal arguments and undermined by pragmatic realism. They go on to 
assert that part of the power of such arguments comes from the fact that they do 
not have to be kept discreet, but rather are publicly sayable and heard as 
positive. However, whilst each discursive move that functions to justify contested 
practice is relatively innocuous on its own, the implications of applying it in the 
larger context of mental health services for children, where professionals have 
more power to determine the course of treatment, might not be so positive. It is 
only when looking at the organisation of the accounts as a whole that their 
potential effects become apparent.  
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 The interest is neither to blame the individuals, nor to identify whether they are 
‘really’ morally adequate, since we all, as professionals, come to work everyday 
trying to make a difference to children’s lives. Rather, the aim is to gain a deeper 
understanding of how these accounts on the whole might function to valorise and 
reproduce particular forms of practice and make them seem reasonable, and so 
consequently they can never be problematised, thus inevitably serving to 
maintain the status quo. The value of such a micro-level analysis then is in 
showing how these broader claims are built upon a more detailed discursive 
work, rather than arising through more abstract ideological claims. 
In her writing (2011), Boyle similarly delineated various strategies that both 
psychiatry and clinical psychology deploy in order to construct distress as a 
mental illness, including avoiding confronting the potential importance of the 
environment in causing distress. She argues that whilst these are not used in a 
planned and conscious way, on the wider level clinical psychology seems to have 
an investment in preserving the status quo in return for academic and 
professional privileges. For example, disregarding the context allows psychology 
to maintain its scientific credibility, hence ensuring both academic and 
professional acceptance (Boyle, 2011).  
 
4.3.  COMPARISON WITH OTHER STUDIES 
In addition to the studies that guided my analysis (e.g., Augoustinos & Evere, 
2011; Stevens & Harper, 2007; Tileaga, 2010) and which have already been 
considered in the analysis chapter because they evidenced similar discursive 
devices, the findings of this research also resonate with a number of the studies 
outlined in chapter one.  
The results of my research also echo the studies of Koehne et al. (2012) and 
Strong et al. (2012) in that they both reported that diagnosing posed considerable 
technical as well as ethical dilemmas for some clinicians from a non-psychiatric 
background. Although the Strong et al. (2012) study has not adopted discourse 
analysis and so has not focused on the action orientation of participants’ talk (as 
did the current study and Koehne et al., 2012), there are similarities in what 
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participants said on a content level. For instance, Strong and colleagues (2012) 
comparably noted that clinicians dealt with their dilemma around needing to give 
a diagnosis by assigning a less specific DSM code to their clients (e.g., 
‘unspecified’ DSM diagnosis), while Koehne and colleagues (2012) reported that 
clinicians, similar to some participants in this study, often chose not to disclose 
the diagnosis to their clients. From a discursive perspective then, these accounts 
have been described as a minimising strategy that functioned to ‘soften’ or 
‘cushion’ the impact of diagnosing. Moreover, the professionals in the Strong et 
al. (2012) study likewise reported to commonly viewing diagnosis as having 
limited clinical currency, rendering diagnosing a necessary administrative task. 
The findings of the current study as well as the studies by Strong et al. (2012) 
and Koehne et al. (2012) thus seem to support the suggestion outlined by Kelly 
and Rhodes (2013, p. 29) that whilst clinicians reject psychiatric diagnoses with 
one hand, they assign disorders with the other, raising ethical and professional 
concerns with the current practice within mental health services. However, on a 
more positive note, these studies also seem to demonstrate the gap between the 
producers of diagnostic manuals and the practitioners who are required to use 
diagnoses in their daily practice which, according to some (e.g., Kelly & Rhodes, 
2013), is widening, suggesting that alternative ways of dealing with people’s 
difficulties would be timely. 
In addition, analogous patterns of accounting identified in the current study, 
namely, assigning responsibility and blame to others to justify professionals’ 
actions have been reported by both Arribas-Ayllon et al. (2009) and Masocha 
(2013). Masocha’s (2013) study, which explored how social workers justify their 
practice with asylum seekers, offers some further striking similarities with the 
current study. Specifically, he reported that the social workers used a range of 
discursive strategies to “absolve professionals of potential charges of being 
individually involved in discriminatory and oppressive practice as well as 
complicity in unethical practices” (Masocha, 2013, p. 13) through portraying 
themselves as “competent”, emphasising their “best intentions” and “doing the 
best they can” to support asylum seeking families. Comparably, any potential 
problems with their practice were attributed to either service users or institutional 
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constraints. Thus, the results of these studies support Sacks’ (1992) notion of 
‘order at all points’, and provide further evidence for the possibility that mental 
health practitioners engage in a similar type of moral accounting when talking 
about their work within the research interview. 
 
4.4.  RESEARCH AND CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In this section I outline how the results of this study might be useful for generating 
further research and for informing clinical practice. 
4.4.1.  Possibilities for future research 
One possible area for future research would be to undertake a participatory and 
emancipatory investigation in order to explore what discursive patterning would 
be devised if it were children, young people or their parents asking psychologists 
about their practice. 
The current study suggested that children might be ambiguous about seeing a 
psychologist. Therefore, another possible avenue of inquiry would be an 
investigation of children’s constructions of their therapy and the meaning they 
make of seeing a psychologist. 
The new research project could use naturally occurring talk in real therapeutic 
encounters rather than interviews. This would provide talk-in-interaction that 
occurs in a less controlled setting, and could potentially identify different ways of 
accounting. This could include examining how psychological practices are 
produced as they happen, for example, how does the ‘parents’ choice’ in 
diagnostic assessment and therapy get negotiated, and where does this leave 
the child’s voice? How are the issues of responsibility and blame dealt with in 
clinical interaction? Or how do children and their parents negotiate the diagnosis 
and medication in their meeting with the professional? (cf. McHoul & Rapley, 
2005). Additionally, it would be interesting to look at the operation of power in 
therapeutic encounters between clinicians and their young ‘clients’. 
A study could be also conducted using the recordings of naturally occurring talk 
in team meetings, case conferences, supervision meetings and other clinical 
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settings when potentially contested issues are raised to see whether similar 
discursive accounting occurs in different settings. Such a study might also allow 
observation of the operation of power in professional interactions, for example 
between different professionals or between trainees and qualified psychologists. 
It would be interesting to investigate if a similar moral accounting would transpire 
during interviews with physicists, asking about their work; the hypothesis being 
that when we deal with human beings, rather than physical constructs, people 
might not be required to engage in moral accounting for their activities. 
4.4.2.  Implications for clinical practice and possibilities for future action 
4.4.2.1.  Developing reflective and reflexive practice  
Reflection and reflexivity are crucial for responsible and ethical practice (Bolton, 
2010). Through paying particular attention to details of talk, this study has 
attempted to make visible “the seen but unnoticed” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 180) 
aspects of everyday child clinical psychologists’ practice by exposing the 
profound moral dilemmas that child clinical psychologists have to deal with in a 
clinical setting. By doing so, this study has contributed to a greater appreciation 
of the fundamentally moral nature of child psychology practice, and therefore also 
to a deeper reflection of contemporary child work.  
Clinical psychology claims its commitments to being reflective (BPS, 2006). 
However, this study suggests that psychologists are largely unaware of the 
strategies they deploy in justifying and legitimising contested practices. 
Consequently, identifying and acknowledging the discursive patterning in 
professional accounts may enable psychologists to develop their awareness of 
the taken-for-granted ways of practicing and the performative nature of their 
language. As a result, this might lead to a more critical and reflective appraisal of 
clinical practice, one’s own values, identities, and the potential effects of 
psychological discourses. One possible way to aid such reflexive practice might 
be to implement models of discourse analysis in training, supervision and service 
research contexts. An illustration of this offers, for example, Heena’s (1998) use 
of ‘reflexive discourse analysis’ that enables expanding the focus of clinical 
supervision by considering professional and therapeutic discourse in a wider 
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context.  
4.4.2.2.  The role of the psychologists and clinical practice 
The findings also point to the fact that perhaps practitioners lack ways of talking 
about the dilemmas and thus resolve them through unconscious rhetorical 
strategies. The implication being that maybe, as clinical psychologists, we need 
to become more transparent and find ways of acknowledging and articulating the 
ethical, professional and practical problems of working with children. This could 
be done by discussing these issues more openly with families, other 
professionals and wider regulatory bodies. For example, it could include providing 
families with more independent, varied and balanced information about the 
medical model, acknowledging controversy around diagnoses and risks 
associated with medication, offering support with critical evaluation of official 
information available to children and parents as well as media representations of 
distress, and encouraging debates about the variability of childhood (e.g., 
Burman, 2008) and the environmental causes of distress. Parents seeking help 
could be supported with their decisions in the face of pressure to adopt 
biomedical solutions for their children’s difficulties and could be signposted to 
alternative resources, such as the works of UK psychiatrist Sami Timimi (e.g., 
Pathological Child Psychiatry and the Medicalization of Childhood, 2002) or the 
website of the US psychiatrist Peter Breggin offering information about 
medication practices 
(http://www.breggin.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=38).  
Parents could also be encouraged to discuss issues of potential feelings of blame 
openly with practitioners, rather than rushing to medical solutions. It is, however, 
recognised that whilst this is an important task to consider, it is also a 
complicated one. Perhaps this could be done by acknowledging and normalising 
unavoidable confusion and ambivalence about causes of children’s difficulties 
(Read, Seymour & Mosher, 2004). Moreover, Coulter and Rapley (2011, p. 172) 
suggest that it may be helpful to recognise that “’being in some way responsible 
for’ an outcome does not, inevitably and necessarily, imply the intent to cause it 
(and hence attract the moral opprobrium that is ‘blame’)”. 
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The findings presented here also indicate that psychologists are trapped in a web 
of societal demands (e.g., the wishes of parents, schools, NHS managers, etc.). 
Consequently, one of the dangers of working within such systems is that one can 
become inured and accustomed to ways of working that might be seen as 
collusive by critics. Perhaps there needs to be more discussion about innovative 
ways of practicing and dealing with these complex issues. The possible 
alternatives, which are consistent with the findings of this study, have been 
outlined (e.g., Boyle, 2011; Dillon, 2013; Harper, 2013b; Rapley, et al., 2011; 
Smail, 2011), and are summarised below: 
• Making the context of paramount importance in theory, research, teaching, 
case discussions, media presentations and everyday conversations 
between service users and professionals. 
• Abandoning medical language in preference for multiple interpretations of 
concerns and people’s own descriptions of problems. 
• Reframing problems – for example, “Instead of saying that fidgeting, 
inattention and disobedience are symptoms of ADHD, say that bored 
children are likely to misbehave in school” (Rapley, 2010); “Instead of 
asking what is wrong with someone, we should ask what has happened to 
them” (Jackie Dillon, Chair of the Hearing Voices Network, England); 
“Instead of asking what’s inside people’s heads, ask what their heads are 
inside” (Harold Garfinkel, Sociologist). 
• Sharing power with people using our services and engaging in advocacy. 
• Critically evaluating our own actions and self-interests. 
• Offering therapeutic interventions based on non-pathologising approaches, 
such as systemic and narrative therapy. However, as Smail (2004) has 
pointed out, these practices often sit too comfortably in mainstream 
medically oriented mental health services, and thus might unintentionally 
obfuscate and sustain the oppressive practices. 
• Adopting critical and community psychology approaches (e.g., 
Prilleltensky, 1999) and setting up or contributing to community services 
and voluntary organisations, such as the Kid’s Company that offers 
practical support to vulnerable children who have been neglected or 
88 
 
abused (http://www.kidsco.org.uk) or the Music and Change (MAC-UK) 
project that makes help accessible to deprived young people. 
4.4.2.3.  Policy and service delivery 
Whilst the BPS raised its concerns with the increasing medicalisation of people’s 
difficulties in its response to the revised DSM-5 (BPS, 2012) and while the NICE 
and other practice guidelines acknowledge the problems with the application of 
biomedical models to children’s difficulties, the standards for ‘good practice’ are 
nevertheless continuously based on them (as discussed in the introduction 
chapter). The results of this study indicate that policy makers and producers of 
clinical guidelines should give further consideration to how bureaucratic 
requirements might impact on the daily practice of individual clinicians, and most 
importantly how this might affect the people who use the services.  
Further action might involve clinical psychologists entering into debates with the 
BPS and regulatory bodies, such as the DOH, and expressing their concerns 
about increasingly medicalised practices. Psychologists are arguably in a 
privileged position to use their articulation skills, power and position in a social 
hierarchy to advocate for the probity of child practices and express their views in 
campaigning activities. Furthermore, the issues could be publicised more across 
the wider professional literature and other media with the ultimate effect of 
improving service delivery to children and their families. 
4.4.2.4.  Dissemination of findings 
This form of intervention would involve making my study widely available on the 
web, which would make the findings freely accessible to a wider audience. This 
would also involve publishing my findings in academic journals. By disseminating 
my findings in these ways, I would hope to make a small contribution to a growing 
body of critical and discursive literature calling for a radical change in 
conceptualising and dealing with children’s difficulties and for moral integrity in 
child clinical practice. I would also disseminate my findings to the child clinical 
psychologists who participated in the interviews and, should they require, make a 
copy of my thesis available to them. 
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4.5.  CRITICAL REVIEW 
This section provides an evaluation of the research based on Antaki, Billig, 
Edwards and Potter (2003) who propose six analytic shortcomings against which 
the quality of discourse analytic research can be evaluated. Below I will 
demonstrate how I ensured these shortfalls were avoided in my study. 
4.5.1.  Under-analysis through summary 
Under-analysis occurs when the data are presented as prose summary, which 
can result in a loss of valuable discursive detail (Antaki et al., 2003). In this study, 
perhaps one of the benefits of undertaking the ‘micro’ level analysis was that it 
helped me stay close to the actual language used and facilitated explicating the 
action orientation of talk by giving specific examples of the utterances produced 
by both participants and myself. 
4.5.2.  Under-analysis through taking sides 
This shortcoming can occur when the evidence of the analyst’s own moral, 
political or personal position towards the data results in taking sides, censorship 
or simplification of what the speakers actually say. However, rather than 
suggesting that analysts should remain neutral, the idea is to avoid substituting 
sympathy or scolding of speaker’s talk based on one’s presumptions (Antaki et 
al., 2003). As such, although I hold my own position towards the subject matter 
as outlined in my methodology section, I have not let this interfere with my data 
analysis. I have endeavoured to be mindful of, and transparent about, my 
position, and to stay close to the data. Providing a range of extracts, situating 
them within the occasioned context of original conversation, including sequences 
with my turns, and substantiating my claims within the details of actions done in 
talk, has hopefully evidenced this.  
4.5.3.  Under-analysis through over-quotation or through isolated quotation 
In this particular shortcoming, the analysis usually presents a fair amount of 
quotations but fails to provide the analyst’s comments on data extracts (Antaki et 
al., 2003). In this study, I aimed to balance each extract with the in-depth 
analysis. Also, as much as the word constraint allowed, I attempted to include 
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extended extracts, proving some discursive context in order to avoid presenting 
single ‘stand alone’ quotations. 
4.5.4.  The circular identification of discourses and mental constructs 
This shortfall can happen when patterns of talk are claimed to be evidencing the 
existence of the wider ideologies, repertoires or discourses, which are then used 
to explicate the particular utterance, resulting in circular identification. In the 
analysis of the data, I sought to support my arguments with the details of the 
actual talk and specific conversational moves. When claiming to use a particular 
discursive device, I drew on other discursive works and tried to explicate the 
function of the specific device in the occasioned context of my data. Also, when I 
made references to the wider ideologies (e.g., impact of language on preserving 
institutional structures), these were discussed separately from the actual data 
analysis (i.e., in the discussion chapter) and presented tentatively only. 
4.5.5.  False survey 
Antaki et al. (2003) argue that this error occurs when researchers extrapolate the 
conclusions drawn from their study to the world at large. Given the qualitative 
nature of my study and specifically the discursive psychology method, I make no 
claims to the generalisability of my finding to a wider population. However, with 
reference to Sacks’ (1992) notion of ‘order at all points’ and Feynman’s (1965) 
idea of the tapestry, I argue that the findings are suggestive of the fundamentally 
moral nature of the clinical psychology enterprise. Thus by shining a light on one 
bit of the fabric, one may sensibly envisage that shining a light on another parts 
of the fabric might reveal similar moral accounting elsewhere in professional 
accounts, including supervision, training courses, or practical reports. 
Furthermore, one might argue that the prevalence of certain constructions and 
devices imply that these are very culturally available. As much as these 
suggestions are qualified, the absolute generalisability nevertheless cannot be 
claimed. 
4.5.6.  Under-analysis through spotting 
This final criterion refers to limiting one’s analysis to the mere recognition of 
discursive features. Antaki et al. (2003) argue that whilst this is an important part 
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of the analytical process, it does not constitute the analysis itself. Therefore, in 
this analysis I have endeavoured to demonstrate the employment of specific 
rhetorical devices illuminating the function that they were accomplishing in the 
talk, rather than just spotting interesting features of the discourse. 
   
4.6.  REFLEXIVE REVIEW 
In providing a reflexive review, I intend to offer a reflection on the approach taken 
in this study, on the process of reporting this study, and finally a further 
consideration of my position towards the subject matter to that already provided 
in the methodology chapter.  
4.6.1.  Reflection of the methodological approach  
I found the discursive psychological approach liberating as it presented me with a 
stimulating alternative to realist and positivist research with which I have 
previously been involved. Whilst it took some practice to ‘see’ the action in the 
talk and perceive data from a process rather than a content level, I found this 
extremely rewarding in that it has influenced my ‘world view’ and how I have 
come to understand communication that goes beyond this study. For instance, I 
have noticed that I have become more mindful of the discursive strategies and 
their potential social function in media reporting, as well as clinical settings, 
enabling me to notice and point to things that have potential to spark curiosity 
from friends and colleagues, and initiate intellectually stimulating and potentially 
important debates, such as deconstructing taken-for-granted ways of practicing. 
4.6.2.  Reflection on research write-up 
Potter and Wetherell (1994, p. 51) argued that discourse analysts should be self-
conscious about their own use of language and methods of argument structure. 
Accordingly, this study can be reflected upon in how it utilised a number of 
rhetorical devices to produce a convincing argument, such as methods of 
constructing a factual account by adding statistical figures when reporting 
concerns about rising ADHD drug prescriptions, to name one. Such reflection, 
however, need not undermine the work. Rather, it can arguably generate a more 
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honest account of one’s work that admits that one’s writing falls under the same 
social psychological processes too.  
In addition, I recognise that any research reporting is necessarily a post hoc 
reconstruction of the original research dialogue (Leudar & Antaki, 1996b), and 
therefore inevitably a subjective construction (Harper, 1999) presenting only one 
small part of the world and the data itself. As such, in this study I have not 
endeavoured to say: ‘it is like this’ but rather “look at it this way” (Stainton Rogers, 
1991, p. 10). 
4.6.3.  Further reflections on my position 
Whilst conducting the interviews for this study, it was important that the 
participants and I shared a professional background. This was not only because I 
knew that some of the practices, of which they were part, were potentially 
problematic, but also that I too could be held accountable for any potential moral 
implications resulting from talking about contested practices, given my 
membership category of a ‘trainee psychologist’.  
Additionally, at times I used a pronoun ‘we’ as my footing26 through which my 
professional identity was evoked. It could be suggested that adopting such a 
footing was my attempt to maintain interview rapport. Moreover, during the 
interviews at times I felt uncomfortable asking challenging questions or 
questioning assumptions. Therefore my use of ‘we’ could also serve to downplay 
my stake in reference to my challenging turns, and allowed me to show my 
empathy towards the participants. In that case, my use of the institutional ‘we’ 
could function to push the accountability back to the institution or the institutional 
practices and our shared identity as clinical psychologists, rather than leaving 
participants needing to be accountable for their individual practice. Consequently, 
my footing of ’we’ could be seen to perpetuate the notion of ‘there is an institution 
we are all in’.  
Finally, although I attempted to take an interventionist approach and explicitly set 
up the interviews as conversations (following a DP method), I nevertheless 
frequently lapsed into the position of a traditional interviewer, in which I asked 
                                            
26 See appendix fourteen for examples of my use of ‘we’ as footing. 
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questions and responded with monosyllabic answers to encourage the 
interviewees to continue talking. Therefore I could have missed interesting 
avenues of inquiry, which I consider to be my learning point.  
4.6.4.  Final reflections  
While previously I have been aware of the ethical issues in child practice, over 
the course of completing this study I have become more appreciative of the moral 
and professional dilemmas that individual psychologists wrestle with in their 
everyday practice. Thus, what I truly relished about this project was the way the 
analysis of the talk-in-interaction brought the area of morality into very clear focus 
for me, and provided me with a different perspective on the subject of child 
mental health and clinical practice with children. I feel that conducting this study 
has led me to think carefully about how I intend to work as a clinical psychologist. 
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APPENDIX 2: INVITATION LETTER 
  
 
 
LETTER OF INVITATION TO PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
< Potential Participants’ Name> 
< Address – Line 1> 
< Address – Line 2> 
[Date] 
Dear Participant,   
 
Re:  Invitation to participate in the research study titled:  
Clinical psychologists’ constructions of their work with children. 
 
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist at the University of East London conducting 
a research project exploring how Clinical Psychologists talk about their work with 
children. I am writing to you to invite you to participate in this project, which would 
involve taking part in a confidential one-to-one interview at a time and place of 
your convenience.  
 
I have enclosed an information sheet about the research project that gives you 
more details on what is involved. If you are interested in taking part in the study, 
please contact me on my email: u1037628@uel.ac.uk. 
 
Thank you for your time.  
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
Katarina Kovacova 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist  
 
Project supervised by: 
 
Professor Mark Rapley  Dr Neil Rees  
Professor of Clinical 
Psychology and Programme  
Director, Professional 
Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology, University of 
East London 
 Clinical Director, Doctoral 
Programme in Clinical 
Psychology, School of 
Psychology, University of East 
London. 
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APPENDIX 3: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION  
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. In order to help you decide 
whether you would like to participate or not, please take time to read the following 
information carefully. 
 
What is the title of the study? 
Clinical psychologists’ constructions of their work with children. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of this study is to explore how clinical psychologists talk about their 
work with children. The researcher will be particularly interested in your narrative 
of these experiences. The study is being conducted as part of the researcher’s 
Doctoral Degree in Clinical Psychology at the University of East London. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been approached to take part in the study, as you are a clinical 
psychologist who routinely works with children in the NHS-provided mental health 
services. Eight to twelve clinical psychologists will take part in the study. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
Participation in the study is entirely voluntary. It is your decision, whether or not 
you take part. If you do agree to take part, you will be free to withdraw any time, 
and you will not be asked to give any reason. 
 
What will happen if I choose to take part? 
You will be asked to sign a consent form that states that you are happy to take 
part in the study. Following from this, you will be invited to take part in a 
confidential, one-to-one, digital-recorded interview lasting about 1 hour in a 
comfortable setting, which could be at your work place or at the University of East 
London. The time and location of the interview will be arranged for your 
convenience. You will be given an opportunity to ask questions before and after 
the interview.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no known risks in taking part in this study. However, should you 
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become distressed and wish to discuss this further, the researcher may refer you 
to a suitable organisation, for example, the relevant Occupational Health 
Department. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
All information will be treated with the strictest confidentiality. The consent form 
and the demographic profile form, which bears your name and details, will be 
separated from the rest of the information. All transcripts of interviews will be 
made anonymous, only distinguishable by the code assigned to each participant. 
Details of the codes will be kept separately to the recordings, transcriptions and 
other details and stored in a locked filing cabinet. Recordings might be 
transcribed by another person who will be required to sign a confidentiality 
agreement. All digital recordings will be erased five years after the date of the last 
interview. Data will be stored in a password-protected computer.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results of the study will be included in a doctoral thesis. Your responses will 
remain completely confidential and your personal details will not be included in 
any documentation. The findings of this research project may be published in the 
future, or presented at a conference. 
 
Ethical Approval 
This research project received Ethical Approval from the University of East 
London.  
 
Disclaimer   
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, up to the point when the data 
is included in the overall analysis. Should you choose to withdraw from the study 
you may do so without disadvantage to yourself and without any obligation to 
give a reason. Should you withdraw, the researcher reserves the right to use your 
anonymised data in the write-up of the study and any further analysis that may be 
conducted by the researcher. 
 
Contact for further information 
Thank you for taking the time to read this leaflet. If you are willing to consider 
participation or have any further questions, please contact the researcher on the 
email address below. Alternatively, you can telephone the Doctoral Degree in 
Clinical Psychology Office on 020 8223 4174/4567 and leave a contact number 
for the researcher to return your call. 
 
Researcher’s details: 
Name:  Katarina Kovacova, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Contact address: Doctoral Degree in Clinical Psychology  
School of Psychology 
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University of East London  
Stratford Campus, University House 
Romford Road 
Stratford E15 4LZ 
Telephone:  020 8223 4174/4567 
E-mail:  u1037628@uel.ac.uk  
 
 
Project supervised by: 
 
Professor Mark Rapley  Dr Neil Rees  
Professor of Clinical 
Psychology and Programme  
Director, Professional 
Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology, University of 
East London 
 Clinical Director, Doctoral 
Programme in Clinical 
Psychology, School of 
Psychology, University of East 
London. 
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APPENDIX 4: RECRUITMENT ADVERT 
 
Recruitment advert placed on the research board within the 
British Psychological Society's Division of Clinical Psychology 
 
Are you a qualified clinical psychologist working with children in a mental health 
service?  I am a trainee clinical psychologist at the University of East London 
exploring how clinical psychologists talk about their work with children.  I am 
conducting this research as a part of my degree.  If you are interested in taking 
part, please contact me on my email: u1037628@uel.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX 5: PROFILE OF PARTICIPANTS  
 
Table 1. Participant profile 
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APPENDIX 6: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Opening question 
• Can you tell me how do you work with children?  
 
Construction of distress 
• How do you make sense of the kind of difficulties children present with in 
your clinical practice?  
o Prompts: Are there any particular models or concepts that you find 
useful and why? Can you give me an example? 
• How do you make sense of it? / How do you understand it? 
 
Responsibility / Parenthood 
• How do you understand the role of parents in conceptualising children’s 
difficulties / distress? 
 
Power 
• How do you work with the power differential between you and your 
‘clients’?   
 
Approach 
• How does the approach that you use shape your relationship with your 
‘clients’?   
 
Therapeutic role 
• What do you see your role to be in ameliorating children’s difficulties? 
 
Defining terminology 
• What do you mean by the term X? 
• How do you understand the term X? 
• How would you define X? 
• What is your understanding of the concept of X? 
• You have said X, can you describe to me what exactly you mean by X?  
 
Children’s voices 
• What barriers do you think there might be to inclusion of the children’s 
views into clinical intervention? 
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• Can you think about a piece of work where you were unable to consider 
children’s voice / opinion / view?  
o Prompts: What were the issues? What did influence your decision? 
How did you explain this to the child? Any things you did particularly 
well or would have done differently? 
• In what ways do you think child’s age influences how you have these 
conversations / who you have them with? 
 
Problem 
• How did it come to be a problem in need of psychological input? 
• What did you see as a problem and why? 
• How did you know it is a problem? 
 
Effects 
• What do you think are the effects of your intervention? 
o Prompts: Effects on child, family, wider context. 
 
Other questions/prompts 
• Could you tell me more about X? 
• Can you give me an example?  
• What is your clinical experience of X? 
• How do you understand X? 
• What do you mean by X? 
• What do you think the effects of X are on the children you work with? 
• What do you think the effects of X are on the parents? 
• What do you think people / clinical psychologists mean when they talk 
about X? 
• Was there anything specific you heard / experienced that led you to...? 
• Is there anything else I should have asked you? 
• Is there anything else you would like to add? 
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APPENDIX 7: CONSENT FORM 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Consent to participate in a research study  
 
Project Title 
 
Clinical psychologists’ constructions of their work with children. 
 
This form requests your name but will not be kept together with the transcription or other 
details of the interview.  
 
Please tick the following boxes: 
 
□ I have read the information sheet about this research and have had the opportunity to 
discuss the details and ask questions about this information.  
 
□ I understand that the interview will be recorded, and that the data will be anonymised 
to ensure confidentiality. I understand that the recordings might be transcribed by 
another person who will sign a confidentiality agreement, and I agree to this. I 
understand that all the electronic and hard format data will be kept securely for five 
years, and then destroyed. 
 
□ I give my permission for anonymised quotes to be used and for the data to be 
submitted for publication. 
 
□ I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time, up to the point when the 
data is included in the overall analysis. I understand that should I choose to withdraw 
from the study I may do so without disadvantage to myself and without any obligation 
to give a reason. I understand that should I withdraw, the researcher reserves the 
right to use my anonymised data in the write-up of the study and any further analysis 
that may be conducted by the researcher. 
 
□ I understand I am not taking part due to my status as an NHS employee or any other 
service in which I work. 
 
□ I fully and freely consent to take part in this study. 
 
Participant’s Name …………………………………………………………………………… 
Participant’s Signature ………………………………………………………………………. 
Researcher’s Name ………………………………………………………………………….. 
Researcher’s Signature ……………………………………………………………………… 
Date ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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APPENDIX 8: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE FORM  
 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE FORM 
 
First name and surname / Code: 
 
Contact details: 
 
 
 
Please tick the box that best describes you, for each of the following areas: 
 
Age: 18 – 25  
 26 – 35  
 36 – 45  
 46 – 55  
 56 – 65  
 65+  
 
Gender: Female  
 Male  
 
Ethnic Group:   
White: British  
 Irish  
 Any other White background  
Mixed: White and Black Caribbean  
 White and Black African  
 White and Asian  
 Any other Mixed background  
Asian or Asian British: Indian  
 Pakistani  
 Bangladeshi  
 Any other Asian background  
Black or Black British: Caribbean  
 African  
 Any other Black background  
Other ethnic groups: Chinese  
 Any other ethnic group  
 
 
Number of years since qualification: 
 
 
Number of years of work with children: 
 
 
Theoretical orientation and speciality: 
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APPENDIX 9: TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTION 
 
 
NOTATION SYMBOLS 
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In addition, the following conventions were adopted for grammar and punctuation: 
 
• Commas, semi-colons, colons, hyphens, exclamation marks, question 
marks and full-stops were used as per prose 
 
• Commas were used between repeated words 
 
• Commas were used between letters or sounds that were repeated 
(stutters) 
 
• Commas were used between unlinked clauses 
 
• Hash was used for interrupted speech (mostly self-interruptions) 
 
• Double hash was used for false starts, i.e. when the speaker begins the 
sentence from scratch, or when s/he interrupts the sentence to start a new 
one 
 
• Double quotation marks were used for direct reported speech, or active 
voicing 
 
• Speech errors were included 
 
• Contractions (gonna, dunno, wanna, kinda) were used, if they were 
included in the Oxford English Dictionary 
 
• Slang / informal words were used if they were included in the Oxford 
English Dictionary 
 
• Where a slang word was used and it was not in the Oxford English 
Dictionary, the spelling used was as near to the heard word as possible 
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APPENDIX 10: ILLUSTRATION OF CODED TRANSCRIPTS  
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APPENDIX 11: WORKED EXAMPLE OF DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS 
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APPENDIX 12: TALK PRECEDING EXTRACT 5 
 
 
The following extract provides the talk preceding extract 5 (lines 2634 to 2658). 
 
Extract 5: KK/P1: Lines 2634-2658, p. 65-66 
 
2634 Kat: =Mmm. Mmm. Mmm. Isn’t it interesting that many 
2635  things we talked about, like biases in the 
2636  research, and everything seems to be about how 
2637  things appear (.) on the outside level, 
2638 Robert: Yes,= 
2639 Kat: =…eh, rather than actually doing something, 
2640  improving something, changing something for the 
2641  better, hopefully. 
2642 Robert: I don’t know if there’s any (.)--  I don’t know 
2643  how to get between those two things, because 
2644  [when I] raised my objections, 
2645 Kat: [Mmm   ]                       M-hm. 
2646 Robert: …when I raised my objections, I made a beautiful 
2647  case, I think, 
2648 Kat: Mmm. 
2649 Robert: …for why it was unethical, and subsequently, why 
2650  it was illegal, 
2651 Kat: M-hm. 
2652 Robert: …and then they did eventually change it, but I 
2653  got quite in a lot of trouble over it. 
2654 Kat: Mmm. 
2655 Robert: Eh (long pause) what I met was (long pause) “You 
2656  know, it really is better for the children to 
2657  have a ‘managed move’. (.) It must be, because 
2658  otherwise we wouldn’t do it”. (.) 
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APPENDIX 13: MAXIMS OF PRACTICAL POLITICS 
 
 
Maxims of Practical Politics 
1. Resources should be used productively and in a cost-effective manner. 
2. Nobody should be compelled. 
3. Everybody should be treated equally. 
4. You cannot turn the clock backwards. 
5. Present generations cannot be blamed for the mistakes of past 
generations. 
6. Injustices should be righted. 
7. Everybody can succeed if they try hard enough. 
8. Minority opinion shouldn't carry more weight than majority opinion. 
9. We've got to live in the 20th century. 
10. You've got to be practical. 
 
 
Adapted from Wetherell and Potter (1992; p. 177) 
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APPENDIX 14: EXAMPLES OF MY USE OF ‘WE’ AS FOOTING 
 
 
Example 1: KK/P1: Lines 870-875, p. 22 
870 Robert: We want to turn the coercive 
871  kids, into pro-social kids. (.) That’s a 
mistake. 
872  (.) 
873 Kat: So what should we be [doing instead? ] 
874 Robert:                      [Well, we should] be trying 
875  to turn them into bi-strategic kids. We should … 
 
Example 2: KK/P2: Lines 1920-1924, p. 48 
1920 Kat: It also sounds like we’ve got a manual. We know 
1921  how best to parent (.) you know, [children]. 
1922 Fran:                                  [But we  ]-  
1923  We sort of do but we don’t, cause we don’t know 
1924  their child, we don’t know their family,       
 
 
 
